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Abstract
Widely recognized security vulnerabilities in current wireless radio access technologies
undermine the benefits of ubiquitous mobile connectivity. Security strategies typically rely
on bit-level cryptographic techniques and associated protocols at various levels of the data
processing stack. These solutions have drawbacks that have slowed down the progress of
new wireless services. Physical layer security approaches derived from an information theo-
retic framework have been recently proposed with secret key generation being the primary
focus of this dissertation. Previous studies of physical layer secret key generation (PHY-
SKG) indicate that a low secret key generation rate (SKGR) is the primary limitation of
this approach. To overcome this drawback, we propose novel SKG schemes to increase the
SKGR as well as improve the security strength of generated secret keys by exploiting multi-
ple input and multiple output (MIMO), cooperative MIMO (co-op MIMO) networks. Both
theoretical and numerical results indicate that relay-based co-op MIMO schemes, tradition-
ally used to enhance LTE-A network throughput and coverage, can also increase SKGR.
Based on the proposed SKG schemes, we introduce innovative power allocation strategies
to further enhance SKGR. Results indicate that the proposed power allocation scheme can
offer 15% to 30% increase in SKGR relative to MIMO/co-op MIMO networks with equal
power allocation at low-power region, thereby improving network security. Although co-op
MIMO architecture can offer significant improvements in both performance and security, the
concept of joint transmission and reception with relay nodes introduce new vulnerabilities.
For example, even if the transmitted information is secured, it is difficult but essential to
monitor the behavior of relay nodes. Selfish or malicious intentions of relay nodes may man-
ifest as non-cooperation. Therefore, we propose relay node reliability evaluation schemes to
measure and monitor the misbehavior of relay nodes. Using a power-sensing based relia-
bility evaluation scheme, we attempt to detect selfish nodes thereby measuring the level of
non-cooperation. An overall node reliability evaluation, which can be used as a guide for
mobile users interested in collaboration with relay nodes, is performed at the basestation.
For malicious behavior, we propose a network tomography technique to arrive at node re-
liability metrics. We estimate the delay distribution of each internal link within a co-op
MIMO framework and use this estimate as an indicator of reliability. The effectiveness
of the proposed node reliability evaluations are demonstrated via both theoretical analysis
and simulations results. The proposed PHY-SKG strategies used in conjunction with node
reliability evaluation schemes represent a novel cross-layer approach to enhance security of
cooperative networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As wireless communication-dependent industries such as smart grid, healthcare services,
and transportation systems rapidly develop, advanced wireless communication networks
must provide higher data rates, lower latency, enhanced security, reduced operating cost,
multi-antenna support, flexible bandwidth operation, and seamless integration with exist-
ing systems. The cooperative multiple input multiple output (co-op MIMO) network [1] [2],
currently incorporated into 4G LTE , is a potential solution for meeting the challenges of
evolving wireless communications [3]. A co-op MIMO network typically utilizes distributed
antennas on multiple radio devices in order to boost network throughput, conserve energy,
and improve network coverage. Co-op MIMO fundamentally groups multiple devices into
virtual antenna arrays (VAAs) in order to emulate MIMO communications. A co-op MIMO
transmission involves multiple point-to-point radio links, including links within a VAA and
links between various VAAs. In practice, many wireless devices may not be able to support
multiple antennas due to dimension, budget, and hardware limitations. A co-op MIMO net-
work is especially useful for allowing those devices to reap the benefits provided by MIMO
networks. Although co-op MIMO architecture significantly improves the performance of
wireless communication, it is vulnerable from a security perspective. Due to the open ar-
chitecture, relay nodes with selfish or malicious intentions may join a cooperative network.
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Selfish nodes may suddenly choose not to cooperate in order to preserve their battery re-
sources or prioritize other services. Malicious nodes, on the other hand, attempt to prevent
communication between source and destination nodes at any cost. Note that an adversary
may control malicious nodes to attack cooperative networks (i.e., denial of service attack at
the physical layer).
1.1 Physical Layer Security
Although a number of distinguished studies have focused on ways to improve wireless
network performance by exploiting advanced network architecture, such as MIMO, co-op
MIMO, and cognitive radio networks, security issues have often been overlooked [4] [2]
[1].Two fundamental characteristics of the wireless medium, namely broadcast and super-
position, present unique challenges for ensuring reliable and/or secure communications in
the presence of adversarial users. The broadcast nature of wireless communications creates
difficulty for shielding transmitted signals from unintended recipients, and superposition can
lead to overlapping of multiple signals at the receiver [5]. Issues of privacy and security in
wireless communication networks have become increasingly crucial as these networks con-
tinue to flourish worldwide [6]. Therefore, investigation of security issues related to wireless
networks has become an increasingly popular research field in recent years. Security has
traditionally been viewed as an independent feature addressed above the physical layer, and
all commonly used cryptographic protocols, such as RSA and AES are designed and imple-
mented with the assumption that the physical layer has been established and provides an
error-free link. However, in dynamic wireless networks, this raises issues such as key dis-
tribution for symmetric cryptosystems and high computational complexity of asymmetric
cryptosystems [7]. More importantly, all cryptographic measures are based on the premise
that their deciphering is computationally infeasible without knowledge of the secret key; but,
this premise remains mathematically unproven. Ciphers that were previously considered vir-
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tually unbreakable are continually surmounted due to relentless growth of computational
power [5]. Existing theoretical and practical contributions support the potential of physical
layer security techniques to significantly strengthen the security of wireless communication
networks [8]. Consequently, secrecy at the physical layer has recently attracted significant
interest among researchers.
The basic principle of information-theoretic security, widely accepted as the strictest
notion of security, requires the combination of cryptographic schemes with channel cod-
ing techniques that exploit the randomness of communication channels to guarantee that
sent messages cannot be decoded by a third party maliciously eavesdropping on the wire-
less medium [9]. Following Shannon’s fundamental work on information-theoretic security,
Wyner introduced a new wiretap channel model [10]. Based on the assumption that the
wiretap channel is a probabilistically degraded version of the main channel, the objective
of Wyner’s keyless security scheme at the physical layer is to maximize transmission rate
of the main channel while minimizing the amount of information leaked to the wiretap
channel (wiretapper). Maurer later presented a strategy that allows joint development of
secret keys between transmitter and receiver with the help of a public error-free feedback
channel [11], thereby permitting secret keys to be extracted between communication par-
ties by exploiting common randomness in the wireless channel (reciprocity). Recently, the
Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprinting technique is proposed by the physical layer security
community as an additional protection layer for wireless devices. Transmitters are identi-
fied by their unique transient characteristics. A receiver can challenge a user to prove its
unique identity to further enhance the security level of wireless communication. Therefore,
the three main thrust areas in PHY-layer security research are (1) keyless security based on
work by Wyner [10] [12] [13]; (2) physical layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) following
the work of Shannon and Maurer [11] [14] [15]; and (3) RF fingerprinting [16] [17].
This dissertation primarily focuses on the PHY-SKG. Secret keys are typically generated
by common randomness that sources extract from channels between parties in a wireless
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communication system. Eavesdroppers experience independent physical channels from le-
gitimate users as long as they are a few wavelengths away from legitimate nodes [18], as is
common in wireless networks. Therefore, keys are secure with an information-theoretic guar-
antee [19]. Compared to a traditional SKG algorithm, such as Diffie-Hellman protocol, the
PHY-SKG technique has the following advantages: (1) a computationally bounded adver-
sary does not need to be assumed [20]; (2) does not require key management, a challenging
issue in traditional key generation schemes [21]; and (3) ability to dynamically replenish
secret keys because wireless channels vary over time [19]. In addition, PHY-SKG can be
used to enhance existing security schemes because it can be implemented independently
from higher layer security schemes [5].
1.2 Challenges in Physical Layer Security
Successful and reliable implementation of a physical layer security protocol in co-op MIMO
networks presents at least two major challenges: security and reliability. These challenges
are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.
Security : Low secret key generation rate (SKGR), a critical performance metric, is the
primary limitation of PHY-SKG. This is straightforward to understand because the security
strength of a secret key is theoretically proportional to key length [22]. As mentioned in
1.1, secret keys are generated using common randomness that sources extract from channels
between parties in a wireless communication system. Traditional invariant point-to-point
communication does not increase randomness between wireless channels as well as SKGR.
Thus, the next stage of PHY-SKG evolution involves exploitation of common randomness
in reciprocal channels using advanced network technology. In addition, power is another
factor that significantly impacts SKGR. Maximization of SKGR under power constraints is
an open research area.
Reliability: In co-op MIMO architectures, mobile users are allowed to recruit relay
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nodes (e.g., idle users, femtocells, and picocells). While PHY-SKG provides protection
against eavesdropping, detecting misbehavior of relay nodes that have already joined the
cooperative communication is very difficult. Selfish or malicious intentions of relay nodes
may manifest as non-cooperation. Selfish nodes may suddenly choose not to cooperate in
order to preserve their battery resources or prioritize other services. Malicious nodes, on
the other hand, attempt to prevent communication between source and destination nodes
at any cost. Note that an adversary may control malicious nodes to attack cooperative
networks, i.e., a denial of service attack at the physical layer. Therefore, understanding
how to measure and monitor reliability of relay nodes is a critical challenge in co-op MIMO
based physical layer security schemes.
This dissertation seeks to address a few fundamental research questions related to these
challenge. These questions and prior efforts to address them are discussed in the following
subsections.
1.3 Research Questions
Question 1: How can one increase the SKGR in order to improve the security strength of
generated secret keys using advanced network technology (e.g., co-op MIMO, etc)?
Question 2: What is the effect of optimizing power on SKGR in MIMO and co-op MIMO
systems?
Question 3: How to measure and monitor the reliability of relay nodes under co-op MIMO
architecture, especially, how to detect selfish relay nodes who suddenly choose not to cooper-
ate in order to preserve their battery resources or prioritize other services?
Question 4: How to measure and monitor the reliability of relay nodes under co-op MIMO
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architecture in a more general manner, i.e., how to detect non-cooperative relay nodes with
malicious behavior?
1.4 Related Work
This dissertation attempts to address the above research questions in the context of co-op
MIMO networks. However, the methods, algorithms, and theoretical results/insights devel-
oped in this work can be applied to any dynamic wireless network with minor application-
specific modifications. From a security perspective, the following subsections summarize
prior work related to the research questions of interest.
1.4.1 Question 1: Increasing SKGR by exploiting common ran-
domness
[23] proposes three types of relay-based co-op MIMO models and provides an overview of
co-op MIMO channel modeling and associated challenges in a cellular system. [19] intro-
duces several prevalent methods to enhance security at the PHY-layer in wireless networks,
and [24] discusses challenges regarding implementation of wireless PHY-layer security. [25]
and [21] present the basics of SKG technique and introduce two popular methods: SKG
based on channel phase and SKG based on received signal strength (RSS). Wang et al. an-
alyze SKG technique based on channel phase randomness [20]. In [26], the authors present
a practical SKG technique based on RSS; however, both [20] and [26] require complex al-
gorithms to realize an acceptable SKGR. In [27], SKG technique is applied to a MIMO
wireless channel, and an information-theoretic measure of SKGR is proposed. Lai et al.
present SKG protocols for a wireless communication system with relays [18], however, their
analysis is limited to single antenna-based point-to-point communication. In the context of
prior efforts in SKG, it is evident that understanding how to effectively exploit relay-based
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co-op MIMO architecture for SKG is still an open problem.
1.4.2 Question 2: Increasing SKGR by optimizing power alloca-
tions
A comprehensive review of physical layer security in wireless networks is presented in [5].
[19] introduces several prevalent methods to enhance security at physical layer in wireless
networks. Challenges related to implementation of physical layer security schemes in wireless
communication are discussed in [24]. [21] and [25] present the basics of SKG and introduce
two popular methods: SKG based on channel phase and SKG based on received signal
strength (RSS). Detailed analysis of SKG based on channel phase randomness is provided
in [20]. The authors of [26] present a practical SKG technique based on RSS. However,
both [20] and [26] require complex algorithms to realize an acceptable SKGR. Wallace et al.
implement SKG in MIMO networks and propose an information theoretic measure of SKGR.
Lai et al. present SKG protocols for wireless communication systems with relays in [18].
However, analysis in [18] is limited to a single antenna-based point-to-point communication.
[28] proposes three types of relay-based coop MIMO models and provides an overview of coop
MIMO channel modeling and associated challenges in a cellular system. Zhou et al. propose
a key generation scheme in a two-way relay channel and discuses optimal power allocation of
SKGR with a passive attacker in [29]. However, the analysis in [29] is restricted to a single
antenna relay network in which all nodes, including transmitter, receiver, and relay nodes,
employ only one antenna. This is not a realistic assumption for contemporary large-scale
wireless networks. (i.e., LTE-A) Furthermore, thanks to the single antenna assumption, the
optimal power allocation problem simplifies to a water-filling solution. In the context of
prior efforts related to PHY-SKG schemes, it is evident that quantifying the effect of power
allocation strategies on SKGR in co-op MIMO architectures remains an open problem.
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1.4.3 Question 3&4: Relay node reliability evaluation
An overview of co-op MIMO networks is introduced in [30]. The authors of [30] propose
three types of relay-based coop MIMO models, and the implementation and performance
of co-op MIMO networks are discussed in [31] and [32]. [33] proposes an energy-efficient,
reliable topological clustering algorithm (ERCTNA) to increase reliability of network topol-
ogy using an auxiliary cluster head node and optimizing information transfer mode. The
authors of [34,35] propose a selection criterion for cooperating nodes in a wireless multi-hop
networks. However, they focus on increasing network level reliability by selecting the best
route from source to destination. [36] introduces a MAC layer scheme for wireless sensor
networks, thereby improving overall network reliability via cooperative communication. [37]
investigates the relationship between node reliability and system performance, where node
reliability is defined as reliability of cooperation, which is modeled via a probability dis-
tribution of non-cooperation. Authentication is a common tool for ensuring reliability.
Therefore, [38] and [39] improve node reliability in cooperative networks by exploiting au-
thentication techniques. However, none of these prior efforts provide any insights into how
to evaluate the reliability of individual nodes [40]. evaluates the reliability of relay nodes
based on a power sensing algorithm; however, the reliability evaluation scheme is restricted
to a specific non-cooperative scenario. Therefore, evaluating and appropriately exploiting
relay node reliability metrics in a co-op MIMO architecture is an open problem that requires
further investigation.
1.5 Contributions of This Dissertation
This dissertation proposes a cross-layer high-level security protocol for co-op MIMO net-
works that can be easily applied to any dynamic wireless network with minor application-
specific modifications. The security protocol contains two main components: PHY-SKG
schemes and relay nodes reliability evaluation schemes. Novel PHY-SKG schemes are pro-
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posed to increase the SKGR, considered to be the main limitation of PHY-SKG schemes.
In order to further improve the security strength, innovative power allocation algorithms
are proposed to optimize the SKGR under MIMO and co-op MIMO architectures. Both
of these efforts demonstrate the feasibility of implementing PHY-SKG schemes to protect
transmitted information in wireless communication. However, even if the transmitted infor-
mation is secured, it is difficult but essential to monitor the behavior of relay nodes since
mobile users are allowed to recruit relay nodes (i.e., idle users, femtocells, and picocells)
during communication. Therefore, in order to measure and monitor the misbehavior of
these nodes, two relay node reliability evaluation schemes that exploit power sensing and
network tomography, respectively, are proposed in this dissertation. First, a power-sensing
based scheme focuses on detecting selfish nodes, i.e., whether relay nodes are cooperating
or not (transmission or not is the primary concern). Secondly, the network-tomography
based scheme generally focuses on identifying malicious nodes i.e., whether relay nodes are
properly cooperate with system or not. In addition, the proposed node reliability evaluation
scheme used in conjunction with proposed cooperative PHY-SKG strategies offer a novel
cross-layer security protocol to significantly enhance security of cooperative networks. In
this regard, the major contributions of this dissertation are presented below, which forms
the foundation of this dissertation:
• Question 1: How can one increase SKGR by exploiting common randomness in co-op
MIMO networks
– This dissertation proposes innovative SKG schemes in two practical scenarios of
LTE-A network with relay-based co-op MIMO architecture.
– This dissertation demonstrates that relay schemes and co-op MIMO techniques
used to enhance throughput and coverage of network, can also improve SKGR.
– This dissertation studies the relationship between SKGR and the number of relay
nodes or number of antennas in both scenarios. Results indicate that the number
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of source antennas play a more significant role compared to the number of relay
nodes in the first scenario and both the number of source antennas and number
of relay nodes have an equivalent impact on SKGR in the second scenario.
Details regarding the findings related to this question can be found in 3 of this disser-
tation and following publication:
– K. Chen, B. Natarajan, and S. Shatti, “Relay-based secret key generation in LTE-
A,” in Communications and Network Security: Physical Layer security workshop.
IEEE Conference on, Oct 2014
– K. Chen and B. Natarajan, “Mimo-based secret key generation strategies: Rate
analysis,” International Journal of Mobile Computing and Multimedia Commu-
nications (IJMCMC), vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 22–55, Jan 2015
• Question 2: What is the impact of optimizing power on SKGR?
– This dissertation extends the basic SKG scheme to the MIMO case and derives
a power allocation strategy.
– This dissertation derives the optimal power allocation for the two novel SKG
schemes proposed for the co-op MIMO architectures.
– Results demonstrate that the proposed power allocation schemes can offer 15% to
30% increase in SKGR relative to equal power allocation in MIMO/co-op MIMO
networks, thereby improving network security.
Results related to this question can be found in 4 of this dissertation and the following
publication:
– K. Chen, B. Natarajan, and S. Shattil, “Secret key generation rate with power
allocation in relay-based lte-a networks,” Information Forensics and Security,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 10, no. 11, pp. 2424–2434, Nov 2015
10
• Question 3: How to evaluate relay node reliability by identifying non-cooperation due
to selfish behavior?
– This dissertation proposes novel power-sensing based node reliability evaluation
schemes to enhance security of co-op MIMO networks.
– This dissertation introduces two distributed node level reliability detection meth-
ods: (1) a one-shot instantaneous reliability detection and (2) Bayesian frame-
work based dynamic reliability detection that incorporates history of node be-
havior.
– A centralized reliability evaluation strategies to fuse the node level reliability
information is proposed. The central server (e.g., base station) can share these
metrics with other mobile users who are interested in recruiting trustworthy nodes
for cooperative operations.
Results related to this question can be found in 5 of this dissertation and the following
publication:
– K. Chen and B. Natarajan, “Evaluating node reliability in cooperative mimo net-
works (under review),” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions
on, 2015
• Question 4: How to evaluate relay node reliability by detecting non-cooperative relay
nodes with malicious behavior?
– This dissertation proposes a novel node reliability evaluation scheme based on
internal link delay distribution.
– This dissertation implements an active probing network tomography to estimate
internal link delay distribution by utilizing an EM algorithm.
– Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the delay distribution based
reliability detection.
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Results related to this question can be found in 6 of this dissertation and the following
publication:
– K. Chen and B. Natarajan, “Network tomography based node reliability evalu-
ation in cooperative mimo networks (under review),” Special Issue on Physical
Layer Security for Emerging Wireless Networks: From Theory to Practice, 2015
1.6 Organization of This Dissertation
Chapter 2 provides the background on basics of physical layer security, performance
metrics, information-theoretic models of SKG, toy example of SKG scheme for wireless
point-to-point network and co-op MIMO networks. Chapter 3 describes the proposed
novel SKG schemes, which significantly increase SKGR as well as security strength
of generated secret keys, by exploiting advanced co-op MIMO networks. In order
to further improve the security level of generated secret keys, Chapter 4 proposes
innovative power allocation algorithms to enhance SKGR by utilizing advantages of
MIMO and co-op MIMO architectures. In Chapter 5, power-sensing based reliability
evaluation schemes are proposed to monitor and measure whether or not relay nodes
are cooperating/transmitting in co-op MIMO networks. Network-tomography based
reliability evaluation scheme is presented in Chapter 6 and can be used to evaluate
general scenarios of relay node misbehavior by estimating internal link delay distri-
bution. Concluding remarks and future research directions are discussed in Chapter
7.
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Chapter 2
Physical Layer Security – Basics
2.1 Basic Information-Theoretic Models for SKG
This section reviews basic information-theoretic models for SKG assuming availability
of a public channel. All prior efforts in this area can be categorized as investigations
based on source-type model (STM) and studies based on channel-type model (CTM).
Following Rudolph Ahlswede and Imre Csiszir’s distinguished works in [45], definitions
of STM and CTM are included in the following paragraphs.
Source-type model: An STM is a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS)
with two component sources and generic variables (X, Y ). Terminal Alice can observe
source outputs Xn = (X1, . . . , Xn) and terminal Bob can observe source outputs
Y n = (Y1, . . . , Yn). In addition, a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity is
available for communication between the two terminals.
Channel-type model: A CTM is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC) {W : X → Y }.
Terminal Alice governs the input of this DMC while Terminal Bob observes output.
In addition to transmissions of length n over this DMC, referred to as a secure chan-
nel, a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity may be used for communication
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between the two terminals.
This dissertation primarily focus on STM, providing background knowledge for further
investigations. A detailed discussion of SKG strategy with unlimited public channel
is initially presented.
2.1.1 SKG strategy with unlimited public channel
For a basic STM, both Alice and Bob can observe source output Xn and Y n, which are
correlated discrete i.i.d source sequences, respectively. In addition, a noiseless public
channel with unlimited capacity is available for communication between Alice and
Bob. Since the eavesdropper Eve can also access the public channel, an SKG strategy
should be deployed between Alice and Bob to prevent Eve from eavesdropping. Alice
generates forward transmission message Φi and Bob generates backward transmission
message Ψi at consecutive instances i = 1, . . . , k by considering communication over
public channels to be an exchange of messages or codewords between two terminals.
Φi and Ψi depend on all available information for corresponding terminal at instance i.
The assumption is made that, at the initially time, Alice and Bob generate independent
random variables MA and MB, respectively. Therefore, the formal definition of an SKG
strategy for STM is as follows:
– Step 0) The terminals generate random variables MA and MB such that X
n, Y n,
and (Xn, Y n) are mutually independent.
– Step 1) The two terminals exchange messages Φi and Ψi over the public channel,
where Φ1 = Φ1(MA, X
n), Ψ1 = Ψ1(MB, Y
n).
– Step i) The two terminals exchange messages Φi and Ψi where Φ1 = Φ1(MA, X
n,Ψi−1),
Ψ1 = Ψ1(MB, Y
n,Ψi−1).
– Final step) Both terminals compute what they deem to be the key established
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by the secret sharing process, as a function of available information:
K = K(MA, X
n,Ψk)) (2.1)
K = L(MB, Y
n,Φk)). (2.2)
For successful SKG strategies, K and L must satisfy certain conditions. For example,
two terminals should generate a common key with a small probability of error.
Definition 2.1.1. SKGR For STM, an SKGR is achievable if for every  > 0 and
sufficiently large n an SKG strategy exists such that K and L satisfy
PrK 6= L ≤  (2.3)
1
n
I(Φk),Ψk;K) ≤  (2.4)
1
n
H(K) ≥ Rs −  (2.5)
1
n
logK ≤ 1
n
H(K) + . (2.6)
Eq. 2.3 means that K should be equal to L with high probability, and Eq. 2.4
means that K and L are secret keys since exchange over the public channel provided
no information concerning the keys. A measurement of SKGR is given in Eq. 2.6,
indicating that distribution of the key is almost uniformly distributed in entropy sense.
This is certainly important when one generated secret key is used for encryption.
Uniform distribution is the maximum entropy distribution among all distributions
with finite support. Because entropy is a measure of uncertainty in a random variable,
higher entropy of encryption keys leads to increased challenges for eavesdroppers to
crack them.
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Evaluation of SKG techniques performance requires a standard performance metric,
as defined below. Maximum secret key generation rate (MSKGR) is
Rsmax = I(X;Y ). (2.7)
In the following sections, MSKGR Rsmax is the standard performance metric for the-
oretical analysis. For simplicity, the term SKGR is used to represent MSKGR in the
following sections.
2.2 SKG Strategies for Wireless Networks
In this section, the basics of the PHY-SKG technique based on the channel reciprocity
property are introduced in order to provide background knowledge for this research
as well as a standard for performance comparison. The following paragraphs outlines
the basic concept behind SKG.
Figure 2.1: A Simple Wiretap Channel Model
Consider a simple wiretap channel model [10] depicting the simplest case of a multiuser
environment as shown in Fig. 2.1. Here, the model consists of three nodes: transmitter
(Alice), receiver (Bob), and eavesdropper (Eve). A general method for generating
secret key between Alice and Bob in the presence of Eve is as follows. Alice/Bob
sends probe signals to corresponding receivers, and the receivers have the ability to
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estimate common random channel state information (CSI) of their communication
channel. Therefore, because channel fading is random, Alice and Bob can convert
their estimated CSI into random bit strings. Theoretically, the random bit strings
generated by Alice and Bob should be identical because of the reciprocal property
of wireless channel. However, in practice, errors and/or disagreements are possible
between the random bit strings. An agreed and corrected secret key is generated with
the help of key reconciliation and privacy amplification techniques [46] [6]. Although
the eavesdropper (Eve) is present during this entire process, the secret key between
Alice and Bob cannot be “stolen” as Eve experiences an independent channel (as long
as the distance between Eve and Alice/Bob is at least one-half wavelength) [47]. In an
other word, the channel between legitimate users and the channel between legitimate
users and eavesdroppers are independent. In order to analyze theoretical performance,
the wiretap channel is transferred to a point-to-point communication system, as shown
in Fig. 2.2. Alice and Bob are two users who want to generate a secret key via a
wireless fading channel. Both of them can transmit over the wireless channel and
public channel [48].The point-to-point system is assumed to be half duplex and the
channel to be reciprocal in a channel coherence time TC . A detailed SKG scheme for
general wireless communication based on previously discussed information-theoretic
models that exploit channel reciprocity via public channels with unlimited capacity [49]
are introduced in the following paragraphs.
Figure 2.2: A Simple Wireless Fading Channel
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Previous research [18] has indicated that two steps are necessary to generate the
secret key via channel reciprocity. In the first step, channel estimation, Alice and Bob
estimate the common channel gain, hAB and hBA, through training. In the second
step, key agreement, Alice and Bob agree on a secret key based on common channel
information using Slepian-Wolf source coding.
For channel estimation, the assumption is made that the amount of time for training
between Alice and Bob is T . Let TA be training time spent by Alice and TB be training
time spent by Bob (TA + TB = T ). The SKG scheme for point-to-point network is
shown in Table. 2.1.
Channel Estimation
Timeslots Action
Timeslot 1 Alice sends a known training se-
quence sA of length L to Bob over
wireless fading channel with trans-
mit power P.
Timeslot 2 Bob transmits a known training sig-
nal sB of length L to Alice over
wireless fading channel with the
same power P.
Key Agreement
Steps Action
Alice and Bob agree on key KAB ex-
tracted from reciprocal fading chan-
nel ( ˜hAB, ˜hAB) using public channel.
Table 2.1: SKG schemes for point-to-point wireless networks
In the first timeslot (TA), Alice sends a known training sequence sAof length L over a
wireless channel. Bob receives
yB = hABsA + nB (2.8)
where, hAB and NB denote channel fading gain from Alice to Bob and Gaussian noise
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at Bob’s receiver. Using similar notation, Bob transmits a known training signal sB
of length L in the second timeslot. Alice receives:
yA = hBAsB + nA. (2.9)
The system is assumed to be half duplex, and the channel is reciprocal.
In order to generate secret key based on common randomness between forward and
backward channels, Alice and Bob must generate the estimation of hAB and hBA,
respectively.
h˜AB = YA
sTA
‖sA‖2
= hAB + nB
sTA
‖sA‖2
(2.10)
h˜BA = YB
sTB
‖sB‖2
= hBA + nA
sTB
‖sB‖2
(2.11)
, where ‖.‖ denotes the norm of its argument. In order to derive theoretical expression
of SKGR, the assumption is made that hAB and hBA are Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and variance σ2AB and σ
2
BA (σ
2
AB = σ
2
BA), respectively, and nA and nB
are zero mean additive Gaussian noise with variance σ2A and σ
2
B (all additive Gaussian
noise are independent of each other). Therefore, h˜AB is a Gaussian random variable
with zero mean and variance σ2AB + σ
2
B/ ‖SA‖2 . Similarly, h˜BA is a Gaussian random
variable with zero mean and variance σ2BA + σ
2
A/ ‖SB‖2 .
The reasonable assumption can be made that the transmit power of Alice and Bob
are equal, thereby denoted as P . Therefore, h˜AB and h˜BA can be rewritten as σ
2
AB +
σ2B/(TAP ) and σ
2
BA + σ
2
A/(TBP ) since ‖SA‖2 = TAP and ‖SB‖2 = TBP . According to
the definition of SKGR, theoretical expression of RP2P can be written as follows.
Assuming the estimated h˜AB and h˜BA are Gaussian random variables with zero mean
and variance σ21 and TA = TB = T , information-theoretic definition of SKGR, the
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typical performance metric, corresponds to [18]
RP2P =
1
T
I(h˜AB; h˜BA) =
1
2T
log
(
1 +
σ41P
2T 2
4(σ4 + σ2σ21)PT
)
(2.12)
where σ2 denotes variance of Gaussian noise, and P is denoted as the transmit power.
T is the time taken for channel estimation and is assumed to be much smaller than
the channel coherence time Tc (T << Tc).
In order to generate uniformly distributed common secret key between Alice and
Bob with the rate shown in Eq. 2.12, a Slepian-Wolf source coding technique is
employed to send helper information between terminals through the public channel
[50]. More specifically, in a random time period TR, Alice observes n = bTR/T c of
random variable h˜AB, where b.c denotes the largest integer that is smaller than its
argument, resulting in a vector h˜AB = [h˜
δ
AB(1), . . . , h˜
δ
AB(n)] to collect all observed
random variables, where h˜AB(i) is quantized with quantization interval δ as h˜
δ
AB(i).
h˜δAB(1) are independent from each other. Using similar notation, Bob observes vector
h˜BA = [h˜
δ
BA(1), . . . , h˜
δ
BA(n)]. Alice randomly divides the typical sequence h˜AB into
non-overlapping bins. According to the information theory, each bin should have
2nI(h˜AB ;h˜BA) typical sequence and each sequence has two variables: bin number and
index within the bin. Therefore, after observing the vector h˜AB, Alice uses the index of
this sequence within its bin as the key and sends the bin number as helper information
(H(h˜AB, h˜BA) bits information) to Bob through the public channel. After Bob receives
the helper data from the public channel, he can combine the helper data and his own
observation h˜BA) to recover h˜AB with probability close to 1. Hence, Bob can recover
the key. Similarly, Alice can recover the h˜BA and key using the same method. The
bin number and index within each bin can also be shown to be independent of each
other. Therefore, even Eve has full access to the public channel, meaning that the
transmitted bin number can be observed through the public channel. Eve is unaware
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of the generated key. The quantization level is set to zero in order to achieve SKGR,
as shown in Eq. 2.12.
According to Eq. 2.12, transmit power P and coherence time T are two significant
factors for SKGR. SKGR increases at an order of 1
2T
logP with increased transmit
power P . With increased coherence time T , meaning that the channel is more sta-
ble (channel changes slowly), SKGR decreases at an order of 1
2T
log T . This discussion
indicates that the next stage of PHY-SKG techniques evolution has two primary direc-
tions: (1) exploitation of common randomness in reciprocal channels using advanced
network technology, such as MIMO, and (2) utilization of transmit power efficiency
using advanced power allocation algorithm. This chapter primarily focuses on the first
direction (i.e., SKG strategies in MIMO and co-op MIMO networks).
2.3 SKG Performance Metrics
This subsection introduces three frequently used SKG performance metrics [51].
2.3.1 Secret key generation rate
SKGR quantifies the rate at which legitimate users can agree upon a shared key se-
quence by exchanging messages via a public channel. For instance, considering an
SKG scenario based on RSS, both Alice and Bob record RSS values of their corre-
sponding signals in a specific time period t. A quantizer is employed to convert their
RSS measurements into random bit strings with length Lt. Consequently, the SKGR
is equal to Lt/t. According to the above analysis, SKGR measures the efficiency of
an SKG scheme, but it is highly dependent on common randomness over wireless
communication channels as well as SKG strategy.
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2.3.2 Secret key disagreement probability
Prior defining secret key disagreement probability (SKDP), the definition of key dis-
agreement should be introduced first. Considering a general SKG process based on
RSS, assume both Alice and Bob have estimated their random bit strings (KA, KB).
A reconciliation technique is deployed to assist Alice and Bob agree on an identical
secret key. The difference between (KA, KB) is called key disagreement. Therefore,
SKDP refers to the probability of the presence of different bits in the key bit string
prior to error correction. A high SKDP dramatically decreases efficiency of key gener-
ation protocol and causes the protocol to fail due to failure of key reconciliation [25].
Experiments in [52] showed that SKDP of SKG schemes is influenced by variations
in the wireless communication channel. In a stationary environment, SKG schemes
demonstrate an unsatisfactory SKDP due to lack of common randomness in channel
fading. For more detailed discussion of SKDP, readers are referred to [52] [20].
2.3.3 Secret key bit randomness
A cryptographic key should be substantially random to prevent an adversary from
cracking the key with low time complexity. Randomness of a bit sequence can be
measured using a National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) tes [53]. If
the p value is greater than 0.01, the sequence is random. For traditional SKG schemes,
a trade-off exists between secret key bit randomness (SKBR) and SKGR, in which keys
should be extracted at different channel coherence time intervals to ensure SKBR since
sampling the channel at a too high frequency produces a key with low entropy.
It is important to note that all performance metrics (SKDP, SKBR and SKGR) are
impacted by limited common randomness in reciprocal channels. Consequently, the
effect of artificially increasing common randomness using advanced network technol-
ogy such as MIMO must be quantified. One goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the
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maximum secret key generation rate (MSKGR is defined in following section) of vari-
ous wireless communication networks, such as point-to-point communication network,
MIMO, and coop MIMO.
2.4 Co-op MIMO networks
As discussed in previous research [54] [55] [56] [57], MIMO architectures have demon-
strated potential to significantly improve throughput, diversity, and range of wireless
communication systems. However, original MIMO systems require the transmitter and
receiver of a communication link to be equipped with multiple antennas that must be
separated by at least half the operating wavelength in order to prevent spatial and
temporal interference. In practice, many wireless devices may not be able to support
multiple antennas due to dimension, budget, and hardware limitations. Those limita-
tions prevent such devices from efficiently taking advantage of MIMO gains. In order
to reap the benefits of MIMO network without restricted by those limitations, co-op
MIMO is proposed. Co-op MIMO fundamentally groups multiple devices into virtual
antenna arrays (VAAs) in order to emulate MIMO communications. A detailed model
of co-op MIMO is presented in Fig. 2.3. As shown in Fig. 2.3, the base station
tower with multiple antennas is denoted as Tx with coverage region represented as a
large circle with radius rT . Mobile phones are denoted as U (target receivers with one
antenna available) and single antenna bases are relay nodes that include picocell, fem-
tocell, and other users (denoted as R1 and R2 in the Fig. 2.3). As communication is
initiated, Tx broadcasts messages to the entire coverage region. Target user U groups
all available relay nodes in a specific region, denoted as a small circle with radius rD,
into VAAs in order to emulate MIMO communication.
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Figure 2.3: A Co-op MIMO network model
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Chapter 3
Cooperative MIMO based Physical
Layer Secret Key Generation
Scheme
Relay nodes, which are low-power nodes that provide enhanced coverage and capacity
at low cost, are an integral part of the LTE-A standard. In order to boost through-
put, co-op MIMO techniques are proposed wherein relay nodes close to end users are
recruited to operate as VAAs. In this chapter, we exploit the coop MIMO structure to
design and implement a physical layer security scheme for LTE-A networks. Specifi-
cally, we consider two relay-based co-op MIMO architectures and propose novel secret
key generation (SKG) schemes for those cases. Information-theoretic results regarding
SKGR are presented. Results indicate that relay-based co-op MIMO schemes, tradi-
tionally used to enhance LTE-A network throughput and coverage, can also increase
SKGR. Our work demonstrates the viability of SKG technique as a potential physical
layer security scheme for LTE-A networks.
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3.1 Introduction
In 2009, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) proposed a new LTE-A standard
that supports higher data rates, better coverage, and lower latencies. LTE-A incorpo-
rates picocells, femtocells, relays, and remote radio heads within a macrocell layout.
These low-power nodes provide enhanced coverage and capacity in target areas at low
cost. Additionally, it is possible to reap the capacity and performance benefits offered
by an multiple input multiple output (MIMO) system, using co-op MIMO schemes
that utilize distributed antennas on multiple devices to work together as VAAs. The
question we seek to address in this work is the following “Is it possible to exploit relay-
based co-op MIMO architectures to enhance security of LTE-A networks at physical
layer? ”
While a number of distinguished studies have been conducted on ways to improve
LTE-A network performance, security issues have often been neglected. Due to the
broadcast nature of wireless channels, wireless networks are threatened by eavesdrop-
ping, message modification, and node impersonation. In order to protect the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and authenticity of transmitted data, secrecy at PHY-layer has
recently attracted considerable attention. Following Shannon’s fundamental work on
information-theoretic security [58], Wyner introduced a new wire-tap channel model
in [10]. Thereafter, Maurer presented a strategy that allows joint development of se-
cret keys between transmitter and receiver with the help of a public and error-free
feedback channel [11]. Since then the two main thrust areas in information theoretic
security research are (1) keyless security based on the work of by Wyner, and (2) PHY-
layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) following the work of Shannon and Maurer.
In this chapter, we focus on the latter problem. For wireless channel reciprocity based
PHY-SKG technique, secret keys are generated by using common randomness that
sources extract from channels between parties in a wireless communication system.
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Eavesdroppers experience independent physical channels from legitimate users as long
as they are a few wavelengths away from legitimate nodes. This is common in wireless
networks. Therefore, keys are secure with an information theoretic guarantee [19].
Compared to a classical SKG algorithm, such as Diffie-Hellman protocol, PHY-SKG
technique has the following advantages: (1) a computationally bounded adversary does
not need to be assumed since secret keys are generated based on channel randomness
[20]; (2) PHY-SKG avoids the requirement of key management, which is a challenging
problem in traditional key generation schemes [21]; (3) secret keys can be dynamically
replenished as wireless channels vary over time [19]. Additionally, PHY-SKG can be
used to enhance existing security schemes as it operates independently of higher layers
security schemes. Our work is based on the hypothesis that relay-based co-op MIMO,
employed by the LTE-A network, can be leveraged to improve SKG performance and
PHY-layer security.
However, previous studies of PHY-SKG indicate that low secret key generation rate
(SKGR), a critical performance metric, is the primary limitation of PHY-SKG. This
is because, the security strength of secret key is theoretically proportional to key
length [22]. Therefore, the next stage of PHY-SKG evolution involves the exploitation
of common randomness in reciprocal channels using advanced network technology, e.g,
MIMO, etc.
In this work, we consider two practical scenarios of relay-based co-op MIMO in LTE-A
networks: (1) no direct communication between source and destination, and (2) di-
rect communication of source with destination. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves
to a specific communication pair in both scenarios. However, our analysis is easily
extended to the entire network. Two novel SKG schemes are presented. For both sce-
narios, we evaluate the information-theoretic expression of SKGR. Numerical results
corresponding to theoretical analysis are also provided.
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3.2 Introduction
3.2.1 Scenario 1: No direct communication between source S
and destination D
In this subsection, we consider a communication scenario in which the end user (des-
tination) cannot communicate with the source due to distance. As shown in 3.1,
assume source S has N antennas. Destination D is a mobile user with one antenna.
Since source S cannot communicate directly with destination D, M low-power relay
nodes are deployed in this scenario. We assume that all relay nodes employ one an-
tenna. In this chapter, we only focus on common randomness sharing, overheads, i.e.,
synchronization overhead of relay nodes, are not considered.
Figure 3.1: System Model of PHY-SKG Scheme
In order to evaluate the SKGR for this scenario, we propose a novel algorithm. Fol-
lowing the time frame described in Table 3.1, in the first timeslot T1, S sends known
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Table 3.1: SKG schemes for Scenario 1
Channel Estimation
Timeslots Action
timeslot 1 S sends known sequence matrix SS
to relay nodes with power P
timeslot 2 Relay nodes forward received se-
quence to D with total power equal
to P . Then, D can estimate a vir-
tual channel h˜SD
timeslot 3 D sends a known sequence sD to re-
lay nodes with power P
timeslot 4 Relay nodes forward received se-
quence to S with total power equal
to P . Therefore, S can estimate a
virtual channel h˜DS
Key Agreement
Steps Action
S and D agree on keys kSD
from(h˜SD, h˜DS) using public chan-
nel.
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matrix Ss with dimension of NXL to relay nodes. L (L > N) is denoted as the length
of known sequence transmitted by each antenna. Assuming all antenna transmit se-
quences are orthogonal to each other, relay nodes received signal is
YSR = HSRSS + NR, (3.1)
where, HSR and NR denote the communication channel matrix between S and R and
Gaussian noise matrix at relay nodes with dimensions MXN and MXL, respectively.
In the second timeslot T2, relay nodes forward received information SRD to D. The
channel model can be written as:
yRD = hRDSRD + nD (3.2)
Since the primary role of relay nodes is to forward the received sequence to destina-
tion, the reasonable assumption can be made that SRD = YSR. Therefore, a virtual
communication channel is constructed between S and D with the assistance of relay
nodes. The received signal at D can be written as:
yRD = hRDHSRSs + hRDNR + nD, (3.3)
where, hRD and nD denote the channel vector between relay nodes and D and Gaus-
sian noise vector at D with dimension 1XM and 1XL, respectively.
In the same manner, in the third slot T3, D sends a known sequence (row vector) sD
of length L to relay nodes. The received signal at relay nodes is:
YDR = hDRsD + NR (3.4)
where, hDR is MX1 channel vector between D and relay nodes.
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In the last timeslot T4, relay nodes forward received information SRS(= YDR) to S to
generate the virtual communication channel between D and S. Therefore, the received
signal at S can be expressed as:
YRS = HRSSRS + NS = HRShDRsD + HRSNR + NS (3.5)
where, HRS is NXM channel matrix between relay nodes and S, and NS denotes
MXL Gaussian noise matrix at S.
Let n
′
D = hRDNR+nD and NS
′
= HRSNR+NS. Assuming T1+T2 = T3+T4 = T/2,
the virtual channel between D and S can be estimated as:
h˜DS = YRS
sTD
‖sD‖2
= HRShDR + NS
′ sTD
‖sD‖2
=
∑M
i=1 hRiS1hDRi +
1
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 hRiS1NRi,l +NS1,l)SDl∑M
i=1 hRiS2hDRi +
1
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 hRiS1NRi,l +NS2,l)SDl
.
.
.∑M
i=1 hRiSNhDRi +
1
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 hRiS1NRi,l +NSN,l)SDl

(3.6)
Similarly, the virtual channel between S and D can be estimated by using a least
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square estimator as:
h˜SD = hSD + n
′
DS
†
S = hRDHSR +
N
TP
n′DS
T
S =
∑M
i=1 hRiDhS1Ri +
N
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 hRiDNRi,l +NDl)S1,l∑M
i=1 hRiDhS2Ri +
N
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 hRiDNRi,l +NDl)S2,l
.
.
.∑M
i=1 hRiDhSNRi +
N
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 hRiDNRi,l +NDl)SN,l

T
(3.7)
Here, S†S denotes pseudo inverse matrix of SS. The above analysis demonstrates that
a secret key can be generated with rate:
RSD =
1
T
I(h˜SD; h˜DS). (3.8)
If we assume: (1) all channel gains are zero mean independent normal distribution; (2)
nD, NR, and NS are zero mean independent Gaussian noise; and (3) additive noises
and channel gains are uncorrelated, we obtain the SKGR for Scenario 1 as follows:

∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2S1Ri
+ N
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2Ri,l
+σ2Dl
) . . . 0
0 . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . 0
0 . . .
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2SNRi
+ N
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2Ri,l
+σ2Dl
)

(3.9)
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiS1
σ2DRi
+ 1
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiS1
σ2Ri,l
+σ2S1,l
) . . . 0
0 . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . 0
0 . . .
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiSN
σ2DRi
+ 1
TP
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiSN
σ2Ri,l
+σ2SN,l
)

(3.10)
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Theorem 1. The SKGR for Scenario 1 corresponds to:
RSD = − 1
2T
N∑
j=1
log(1− ajTP
ajTP + cj
ajTP
ajTP +Nb
) (3.11)
where, aj =
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2SjRi , b =
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2Ri,l+σ
2
Dl
) and cj =
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiSj
σ2Ri,l+
σ2Sj,l).
Since h˜SD and h˜DS are multivariate Gaussian, results from [59] can be used to write
the mutual information between h˜SD and h˜DS:
I(h˜SD; h˜DS) = −1
2
log(
∣∣Ch˜SD,h˜SD∣∣ ∣∣Ch˜DS,h˜DS∣∣
|C| ) (3.12)
where, |·| represents the determinant of matrix, Ch˜SD,h˜SD is the auto-correlation matrix
of h˜SD, as shown in Eq. 3.9 and Eq. 3.10 (located at the beginning of next page). |C|
corresponds to:
|C| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Ch˜SD,h˜SD Ch˜SD,h˜DS
Ch˜DS,h˜SD Ch˜DS,h˜DS
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ (3.13)
According to [27], Ch˜SD,h˜DS = Ch˜DS,h˜SD = ChSD,hSD = ChDS,hDS . The SKGR of
channel between S and D can be written as:
RSD = − 1
2T
log
(
∣∣I−Ch˜DS,h˜DS−1Ch˜DS,h˜SDCh˜SD,h˜SD−1Ch˜SD,h˜DS∣∣) (3.14)
A combination of Eqs. 3.9, 3.10, and 3.12 produces:
RSD = − 1
2T
log(
N∏
j=1
(1− ajTP
ajTP + cj
ajTP
ajTP +Nb
)) (3.15)
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3.2.2 Scenario 2: S with multiple antennas and direct com-
munication with D
In this subsection, we consider a scenario in which no restriction exists between des-
tination D, source S and relay nodes, i.e., they can spontaneously communicate with
each other. As shown in Fig. 3.1, M relay nodes are deployed, all relay nodes employ
one antenna. N antennas are assembled with source S. The destination is a mobile
device with one antenna. Without considering overheads, we propose another SKG
algorithm for this scenario and evaluate the SKGR.
Following the time frame shown in Table 3.2 , in the first timeslot T1, each antenna
of S sends a known matrix Ss to relay nodes and D. Assuming the sequences are
orthogonal to each other, the signal received at D is:
ySD = hSDSS + nD (3.16)
where hSD and SS denote the channels vector between S and D and known sequences
matrix sent by S, respectively. nD is the Gaussian noise vector at D. Using similar
notation, relay nodes receive:
YSR = HSRSS + NR (3.17)
Assuming T1 = T2 = T3 = T/3, the estimated channel h˜SD and H˜SR can be written
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Table 3.2: SKG schemes for Scenario 2
Channel Estimation
Timeslots Action
timeslot 1 S sends known sequence matrix SS
to D and relay nodes with power P .
Therefore, D and relay nodes can es-
timates h˜SD and H˜SR, respectively
timeslot 2 D sends a known sequence sD to
S and relay nodes with power P .
Then, S and relay nodes can esti-
mate h˜DS and h˜DR, respectively.
timeslot 3 Relay nodes send known sequence
matrix SR to S and D with power
P . Thus, S and D can estimate H˜RS
and h˜RD, respectively.
Key Agreement
Steps Action
step 1 S and D agree on keys kSD from
( ˜hSD, ˜hDS) using public channel.
step 2 S and relay nodes agree on keys kSR
from ( ˜hSR, ˜hRS) using public chan-
nel.
step 3 D and relay nodes agree on keys kDR
from ( ˜hDR, ˜hRD) using public chan-
nel.
step 4 Setting (kSD, min(kSR,kDR)) as the
key, where (Ki, Kj) denotes the con-
catenation of Ki and Kj
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as:
h˜SD = hSD +
3N
TP
nDS
T
S =

hS1D +
3N
TP
∑L
l=1NDlS1,l
.
.
.
hStND +
3N
TP
∑L
l=1NDlSN,l

T
(3.18)
H˜SR = HSR +
3N
TP
NRS
T
S =
hS1R1 +
3N
TP
∑L
l=1NR1,lS1,l . hSNR1 +
3N
TP
∑L
l=1NR1,lSN,l
. . .
. . .
. . .
hS1RM +
3N
TP
∑L
l=1NRM,lS1,l . hSNRM +
3N
TP
∑L
l=1NRM,lSN,l

T
(3.19)
Similarly, at the second timeslot T2, D sends sD with length L to relay nodes and S.
Received signals at S and relay nodes are:
YDS = hDSsD + NS (3.20)
YDR = hDRsD + NR (3.21)
In the same manner, estimated channel h˜DS and h˜DR are:
h˜DS = YDS
sTD
‖sD‖2
=

hDSt1 +
3
TP
∑L
l=1NS1,lSDl
.
.
.
hDStN +
3
TP
∑L
l=1NSN,lSDl

(3.22)
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h˜DR = YDR
sTD
‖sD‖2
=

hDR1 +
3
TP
∑L
l=1NR1,lSDl
.
.
.
hDRN +
3
TP
∑L
l=1NRN,lSDl

(3.23)
In the last timeslot T3, relay nodes send SR to S and D. Assuming all L length
sequences are orthogonal, received signals are:
YRS = HRSSR + NS (3.24)
yRD = hRDSR + nD (3.25)
Using the same method, the estimated channels, h˜RD and H˜RS, can be written as:
h˜RD = hRD +
3M
TP
nDS
T
R =

hR1D +
3M
TP
∑L
l=1NDlSRl,l
.
.
.
hRMD +
3M
TP
∑L
l=1NDlSRM,l

T
(3.26)
H˜RS = HRS +
3M
TP
NSS
T
R =
hR1S1 +
3M
TP
∑L
l=1NS1,lSR1,l . hRMS1 +
3M
TP
∑L
l=1NS1,lSRM,l
. . .
. . .
. . .
hR1SN +
3M
TP
∑L
l=1NSN,lSR1,l . hRMSN +
3M
TP
∑L
l=1NSN,lSRM,l

(3.27)
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With assumptions similar to that in the previous scenario, the SKGR for Scenario 2
is given by theorem below:
Theorem 2. The SKGR for Scenario 2 corresponds to:
Rco−op =
1
T{
I
(
h˜SD; h˜DS
)
+min
{
I
(
H˜SR; H˜RS
)
, I
(
h˜DR; h˜RD
)}} (3.28)
where, mutual information terms are:
I
(
h˜SD; h˜DS
)
= −1
2
N∑
j=1
log
(1− σ
2
SjD
TP
σ2SjDTP + 3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
σ2SjDTP
σ2SjDTP + 3
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
)
(3.29)
I
(
h˜DR; h˜RD
)
= −1
2
M∑
i=1
log
(1− σ
2
DRi
TP
σ2DRiTP + 3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
σ2DRiTP
σ2DRiTP + 3
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
)
(3.30)
I
(
H˜SR; H˜RS
)
= −1
2
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
log
(1− σ
2
SjRi
TP
σ2SjRiTP + 3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
σ2SjRiTP
σ2SjRiTP + 3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
)
(3.31)
The proof follows arguments similar to that presented for Scenario 1.
3.3 Results
In this subsection, we numerically compute the SKGR for both scenarios and compare
it to the SKGR of a point-to-point communication scenario. We set the coherence
time to be Tc = 1s and the length of training sequences L = 10. Without loss of
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Figure 3.2: Numerical Results for Scenario 1
generality, we assume all channel gains are normally distributed with zero mean and
variance equal to 1, and Gaussian noise sources are assumed to be zero mean with
variance equal to 1. As seen in Fig. 3.2, in Scenario 1, we plot SKGR as a function
of signal to noise ratio (SNR) corresponding to four cases: S with one antenna and
one RN (original case), S with two antennas and one RN (co-op MISO), S with one
antenna and two relay nodes (co-op SIMO), and S with two antennas and two relay
nodes (co-op MIMO). Results in Fig. 3.2 indicate that an increased number of relay
nodes or source antennas leads to improved SKGR. We also discovered that increasing
the number of source antennas significantly improves SKGR as compared to increasing
the number of relay nodes. This is because assembling more antennas in S increases
the number of virtual channels. Deploying additional relay nodes also improves SKG
performance by enhancing the randomness of the channel. However, the system is still
a virtual single input and single out (SISO) model. Therefore, system with relay-based
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Figure 3.3: Numerical Results for Scenario 2
co-op MIMO architecture achieved the best SKG performance in Scenario 1.
Fig. 3.3 compares the SKGR corresponding to four cases, as mentioned above, in
Scenario 2. The figure illustrates that SKGR increased with number of source antennas
or relay nodes increased. This trend is especially useful as it suggests that relay-based
SKG offers a way to generate large-size keys critical to secure the LTE-A network.
Fig. 3.3 also demonstrates that a system with relay-based co-op MIMO architecture
achieved the best SKG performance. However, the assembly of additional antennas at
source or the deployment of additional relay nodes have identical impact on SKGR.
This aspect is further investigated in the following discussion.
Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5 indicate SKGR as a function of the number of antennas in S and
a varying number of relay nodes with SNR=15 in both scenarios. In Scenario 1, Fig.
3.4 demonstrates that, for SKGR, the impact of the number of source antennas is more
significant than the impact of the number of relay nodes. This can be explained as
40
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Number of antenna assembled with S
SK
G
R
 
 
1 RN
2 RNs
3 RNs
4 RNs
Figure 3.4: Relation between SKGR and N ,M for Scenario 1
iiniin 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 50.30.320.340.360.380.40.420.440.46 Number of antenna assembled with SSKGR   1 RN2 RNs3 RNs4 RNs
Figure 3.5: Relation between SKGR and N ,M for Scenario 2
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follows: in Scenario 1, relay nodes were deployed to enhance the coverage of S as well
as to enrich channel randomness. Nevertheless, additional source antennas increased
the number of virtual channels between S and D. In Scenario 2, both the number
of relay nodes and source antennas significantly impact SKGR since they played an
equivalent role in the improvement of network throughput and the enrichment of
channel randomness. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 3.5, the overall performance in
Scenario 2 was much better than Scenario 1.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigates SKG performance in LTE-A network with relay-based co-op
MIMO architecture. We present two practical LTE-A scenarios and propose novel
SKG schemes for each scenario. We evaluate the information theoretic result for
SKGR. Numerical results on SKGR demonstrated the feasibility of relay-based SKG in
PHY-Layer of LTE-A. Future work will involve trade-off analysis between energy/RN
synchronization/overhead cost and SKG performance under our proposed relay based
co-op MIMO schemes. Also, we will extend our PHY-SKG method to the entire
network, including interference alignment and artificial noise injection techniques
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Chapter 4
Chapter 4: Secret Key Generation
Rate With Power Allocation in
Relay-Based LTE-A Networks
LTE-A networks exploit low-power relay nodes, picocells and femtocells to boost
throughput, enhance coverage, decrease latency, and reduce cost. End users in a
relay-based LTE-A network can recruit relay nodes to cooperate as virtual antenna
arrays, thereby reaping the benefits offered by MIMO techniques. Although relay-
based cooperative MIMO (coop MIMO) implementation in LTE-A networks improves
performance, security issues are often overlooked. This chapter introduces a physical
layer (PHY-layer) security scheme for point-to-point networks and extends this scheme
to MIMO networks. Two practical relay-based coop MIMO architectures and corre-
sponding secret key generation (SKG) schemes are presented. For both the MIMO
and coop MIMO networks, the impact of proposed power allocation on secret key
generation rate is quantified via theoretical and numerical analysis. Results indicate
that proposed power allocation scheme can offer 15% − 30% increase in secret key
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generation rate (SKGR) relative to MIMO/coop MIMO networks with equal power
allocation at low power region, thereby improve network security.
4.1 Introduction
In 2009, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) proposed the development
of Long Term Evolution Advanced (LTE-A), deployed in a macro/microcell layout.
Objectives of this project include providing improved system capacity and coverage,
increasing peak data rates, decreasing latency, reducing operating costs, providing
multi-antenna support, creating flexible bandwidth operation, and seamless integra-
tion with existing systems [54]. In addition, LTE-A supports heterogeneous deploy-
ments in which low-power nodes including picocells, femtocells, relays, and remote
radio heads are placed in a macrocell layout. With these low-power nodes, LTE-A
provides enhanced coverage and capacity in target areas at low cost. Additionally,
LTE-A allows for cooperative MIMO (coop MIMO) where distributed antennas on
multiple radio devices work together as virtual antenna arrays (VAAs) to emulate
MIMO communications. This is especially useful as many wireless devices may not
be able to support multiple antennas due to dimension, budget, and hardware limita-
tions, thereby preventing such devices from reaping MIMO gains. Although a number
of distinguished studies have focused on ways to improve LTE-A network performance
by exploiting coop MIMO schemes [4], security issues have often been overlooked.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, wireless networks are threatened
by eavesdropping, message modification, and node impersonation. Adversarial users
are modeled as unauthorized users attempting to extract information from legitimate
users. To protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of transmitted data,
secrecy at the physical layer (PHY-layer) has recently attracted significant interest
among researchers [60–63].
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Traditional key-based enciphering techniques are limited by key distribution and com-
putational complexity [5]. Therefore, following the distinguished work by Shannon
[58], wireless channel reciprocity-based physical layer secret key generation (PHY-
SKG) techniques have garnered attention in wireless security community. These tech-
niques generate secret keys using common randomness that is extracted from channels
between parties in a wireless communication system. Eavesdroppers experience inde-
pendent physical channels from legitimate users as long as they are a few wavelengths
away from legitimate nodes. Therefore, the keys are secured with an information
theoretic guarantee [19].
Our preliminary work in [41] indicates that relay-based coop MIMO architectures
can significantly improve SKGR by exploiting common randomness. Reference [18]
demonstrates that SKGR is highly depended on transmit power. Therefore, in this
chapter, we quantify the effect of optimizing power allocations in relay based LTE-A
network on SKGR.
In the context of prior efforts related to PHY-SKG schemes, it is evident that quanti-
fying the effect of power allocation strategies on SKGR in coop MIMO architectures
remains an open problem. We attempt to bridge this gap in this work.
In this work, we initially review the SKG algorithm for point-to-point networks. Then,
we extend the basic algorithm to the MIMO case and provide a corresponding power
allocation strategy. In addition, two SKG schemes with corresponding practical relay-
based coop MIMO architectures are introduced. Case 1 corresponds to no direct
connection between source and destination and Case 2 assumes that direct commu-
nication between source and destination is feasible. To further enhance SKGR, we
propose two power allocation strategies for these two scenarios, respectively. Detailed
theoretical analysis of proposed power allocation strategies are presented for MIMO
and coop MIMO networks. We also provide numerical results to demonstrate the
performance of our proposed power allocation strategies. Results demonstrate that
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proposed power allocation scheme can offer 15% − 30% increase in SKGR relative
to MIMO/coop MIMO networks with equal power allocation at low power region,
thereby improve network security.
4.2 Secret Key Generation in MIMO Networks
It is easy to extend the SKG scheme of point-to-point networks discussed in Chapter
2 to MIMO networks. A MIMO channel model is presented in Fig. 4.1. Alice, a
legitimate transmitter with M antennas, desires to securely communicate with Bob,
a legitimate receiver with N antennas over a wireless channel. As mentioned earlier,
assume a public channel with unlimited capacity is available to assist secret key gen-
eration. Therefore Alice and Bob can exchange information regarding to the secret
keys using the public channel. To protect the communication between Alice and Bob,
a similar SKG strategy based on the common fading channel is applied. Details are
shown next.
Figure 4.1: Network model of MIMO system
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In the first time slot TA, each antenna of Alice’s transmitter sends a known sequence
sAi of length L over a wireless channel. Assuming all antenna transmitted sequences
are orthogonal to each other, Bob receives:
YB = HABSA + NB (4.1)
where, HAB denotes channel fading from Alice to Bob with dimension of N × M ;
SA = [sA1 , sA2 , ..., sAM ] is the probe signal with dimension of M ×L; NB is Gaussian
noise at Bob’s receiver with dimension of N×L. Using similar notation, each antenna
of Bob’s transmitter sends a known sequence sBi of length L over a wireless channel
in the second timeslot TB. Alice receives:
YA = HBASB + NA (4.2)
where, HBA denotes channel fading from Bob to Alice with dimension of M × N ;
SB = [sB1 , sB2 , ..., sBN ] is the probe signal with dimension of N × L; NA is Gaussian
noise at Alice’s receiver with dimension of M ×L. From results of point-to-point case,
SKGR between Alice and Bob can be written as:
RSMIMO = I(H˜AB; H˜BA) (4.3)
where, H˜AB and H˜BA denote estimated channel between Alice and Bob and estimated
channel between Bob and Alice, respectively.
To generate secret key based on common randomness between forward and backward
channels, Alice and Bob must generate estimates of HAB and HBA, respectively. The
assumption is made that the amount of time spent training for Alice and Bob is equal
(TA = TB =
T
2
). The estimated channel from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Alice can
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be written as:
H˜AB = HAB + NBS
†
A = HAB +
2N
TP
NBS
T
A (4.4)
H˜BA = HBA + NAS
†
B = HBA +
2M
TP
NAS
T
B (4.5)
where, S†A and S
†
B represent pseudo inverse matrices of training signal SA and SB
(S†. = S
T
. (S.S
T
. )
−1), respectively. The Gaussian assumptions for (1) the HAB and
HBA, and (2) noise NA and NB result in Gaussian random matrices H˜AB and H˜BA.
The elements of H˜AB and H˜BA are therefore independent Gaussian with mean zero
and variance σ2AjBi where j corresponds to the j
th antenna of Alice and i represents
the ith antenna of Bob. In the following lemma, we present the SKGR in a MIMO
network (proof can be found in our previous work [64]).
Lemma 3. SKGR of Alice and Bob can be expressed as
I
(
H˜AB; H˜BA
)
= −1
2
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
log
(1− σ
2
AjBi
TPi
σ2AjBiTPi + 2N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ai,l
σ2AjBiTQj
σ2AjBiTQj + 2M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Bj,l
)
(4.6)
where, Pi and Qj are the transmit power of i
th antenna of Alice and the transmit
power of jth antenna of Bob, respectively. l=1...L is the index of the probe signal,
therefore, σ2Ai,l and σ
2
Bj,l
are the variances of Gaussian noise at the receiver of Alice
and Bob at index l.
4.2.1 Sub-Optimum Power Allocation in MIMO networks
In our prior work, we assume that equal power is assigned to Alice and Bob and that
power is evenly distributed to each antenna, respectively. However, in a practical
case, antennas can simultaneously transmit data over multiple wireless channels by
assigning power to the communication link according to power allocation schemes.
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Observation of the derived expression of SKGR for MIMO networks (Eq. 4.6) reveals
that SKGR is determined by power allocation and variance of channel estimators.
Due to the training process, both Alice and Bob have the prior knowledge of channel
estimators. Therefore, implementation of a power allocation algorithm is feasible in
the MIMO case. Based on Eq. 4.6, it is easy to express the power allocation problem
as follows:
maximize
Pi,Qj
∀i=1,...,M ;j=1,...,N
RSMIMO
subject to
M∑
i=1
Pi ≤ PA
N∑
j=1
Qj ≤ PB
Pi ≥ 0;Qj ≥ 0.
Here, PA and PB are the total transmit power at Alice and Bob’s transmitter, respec-
tively.
We must verify convexity/concavity of the objective function in order to claim op-
timality of any optimization algorithm. A brief analysis of the above maximization
problem indicates that the objective function is non-concave (see proof in Appendix
A). Therefore, it is difficult to determine the optimal solution with reasonable com-
plexity. However, Eq. 4.6 suggests that the objective function is concave in either Pi
or Qj(i = 1, ..,M and j = 1, ..., N) when the other parameters are fixed. Therefore,
in order to maximize the SKGR of MIMO networks, we employ an alternating maxi-
mization method [65] [66] to maximize SKGR as a function of each Pi and Qj. This
approach yields a suboptimal solution. We first examine the concavity of Eq. 4.6 as
a function of Pi for fixed Qj; j = 1...N or Qj for fixed Pi; i = 1...M .
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Lemma 4. Assuming y (or x) is a fixed parameter, then
− 1
2
log[1−
σ2AjBiTx
(σ2AjBiTx+ 2N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ai,l
)
σ2AjBiTy
(σ2AjBiTy + 2M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Bj,l
)
]
(4.7)
is a concave function of x (or y).
Proof. See Appendix B.
Fixing Qjs, the optimization problem can be written as.
maximize
Pi
∀i=1,...,M
RSMIMO
subject to
M∑
i=1
Pi ≤ PA
Pi ≥ 0
We can apply the Lagrangian form on RSMIMO as a function of Pis corresponding to
L = RSMIMO + µ1(PA −
M∑
i=1
Pi) +
M∑
i=1
µi+2Pi (4.8)
The Karush Kuhn Tucker (KKT) conditions are:
∂L
∂Pi
=
∂RSMIMO
∂Pi
− µ1 + µi+2 = 0 (4.9)
µ1(PA −
M∑
i=1
Pi) = 0; (4.10)
µi+2Pi = 0 (4.11)
µi+2 ≥ 0;µ1 ≥ 0 (4.12)
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Eq. 4.9 demonstrate that µ1 > µi+2 ≥ 0. Therefore, combining this equation with Eq.
4.10 and Eq. 4.12, we can show that PA −
∑M
i=1 Pi = 0. Assuming all antennas are
used for signaling, the powers Pi and Qj should be greater than zero, µi+2 = 0.
Therefore, KKT conditions can be rewritten as the following equalities:

N∑
j=1
Qj
(Pi + ai,j)(Qj + bi,j(Pi + ai,j))
− µ1 = 0
PA −
M∑
i=1
Pi = 0
(4.13)
where ai,j =
3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Aj,l
σ2Aj,Bi
T
and bi,j =
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Bi,l
3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Aj,l
. Assuming we have a equal power
distribution at Bob’s transmitter side (Qj) in the initial state, Eq. 4.13 can be solved
using a water-filling approach as described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Water-filling Algorithm
1): Compute corresponding ai,j and bi,j for i = 1, . . . ,M and j = 1, . . . , N
2): Calculate µ1 =
4bi,jNPB
(2bi,j(PB+ai,j)+PB)2−P 2B
3): Using µ1, compute Pi =
−PB+√P 2B+ 4bi,jNPBµ1
2bi,j
− ai,j
+ for i = 1, . . . ,M
4): If all Pis are non-negative, then end. Otherwise, set Pi = 0 and proceed to Step 3
The symmetric form of Eq. 4.6 allows us to write the Lagrangian in a similar form for
all steps of the alternating maximization approach. Using the updated power alloca-
tion at Alice’s transmitter side (from water-filling algorithm), we have the following
optimization problem:
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maximize
Qj
∀j=1,...,N
RSMIMO
subject to
N∑
j=1
Qj ≤ PB
Qj ≥ 0
Applying the same approach, we have following equalities as a function of Qj

N∑
i=1
Pi
(Qj + ci,j)(Pi + di,j(Qj + ci,j))
− µ2 = 0
PB −
N∑
j=1
Qj = 0
(4.14)
where ci,j =
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Bi,l
σ2Aj,Bi
T
and di,j =
3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Aj,l
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Bi,l
.
Using the similar water-filling algorithm, we update the power allocation at Alice’s
transmitter side based on the derived power allocation at Bob’s transmitter side from
previous state. Continuing this forward and backward iterations, a local optimum
power allocation at both Alice and Bob’s transmitter can be achieved as proven in [67].
Consequently, the alternating maximization algorithm can be described as follows
(Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2 Alternating Maximization Algorithm
0): In the initial state 0, setting Qj0 =
PB
N
,∀j = 1, 2, ..., N as a equal power distribution at
Bob’s transmitter side, the power allocation of Alice’s transmitter side (Pi0) can be solved
by using water-filling algorithm.
1): Calculate the power allocation at Bob’s transmitter side (Qj1) based on Pi0 by using
similar water-filling algorithm.
. . .
k): Update Pik based on the Qjk
k + 1): Use Pik to calculate the Qjk+1
. . .
Terminate iterations when ‖Pik+1 − Pik‖2 ≤ ε and ‖Qjk+1 −Qjk‖2 ≤ ε.
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4.3 Secret Key Generation Schemes for Coop MIMO
Networks
In this section, we extend our proposed power allocation schemes to coop MIMO
networks. Based on our prior work [41], we propose two coop MIMO network models
and corresponding novel power allocation strategies in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Coop MIMO network: Scenario 1
In this section, we consider a communication scenario in which the end user (desti-
nation) cannot communicate with the source due to distance. As shown in Fig. 4.2,
Source S is assumed to have N antennas. Destination D is a mobile user with one an-
tenna. Since Source S cannot communicate directly with Destination D, M low-power
relay nodes (RNs) are deployed in this scenario. We assume that all RNs employ one
antenna. In this chapter, we focus only on common randomness sharing overhead,
i.e., synchronization overhead of RNs, are not considered. Using a similar notation as
presented in Section III, we have the following lemma related to SKGR (proved in our
earlier work [41]) in this scenario:
Lemma 5. According to the theoretical analysis in [41], SKGR for coop MIMO:
Scenario 1 can be written as:
Rcoop1 = −
1
2T
N∑
j=1
log[1− ajTPT
(ajTPT + cj)
ajTQj
(ajTQj +Nb)
] (4.15)
where, PT is the total transmit power; aj =
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2SjRi , b =
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiD
σ2Ri,l+
σ2Dl) and cj =
∑L
l=1(
∑M
i=1 σ
2
RiSj
σ2Ri,l + σ
2
Sj,l
).
As we can observe from Eq. 4.20, SKGR is determined by the assigned power to
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Figure 4.2: Network model of coop MIMO architecture: Scenario 1
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each antenna/relay node and variance of channel estimators. Therefore, the power
allocation problem for this scenario can be written as:
maximize
Qj
∀j=1,...,N
Rcoop1
subject to
N∑
j=1
Qj ≤ PS + PR
Qj ≥ 0
One thing we need to mention here is that it is possible to transfer our original coop
MIMO architecture to a virtual MISO network (as shown in [41]). Consequently, in
this case, we need to assign the total power PT , a summation of transmit power of
source PS and transmit power of relay nodes PR (PT = PS + PR and PR < PS) as the
transmit power for the forward path.
In order to solve this power allocation problem, we need to examine the concavity
of the objective function (Eq. 4.20). It is easy to figure out that Eq. 4.20 has a
very similar form compared to the objective function in MIMO case. Using a similar
approach, we can prove that Eq. 4.20 is a concave function of Qj when PT is fixed.
Application of Lagrangian form to the objective function allows the optimization prob-
lem to be written as:
L = Rcoop1 + µ1(PT −
N∑
j=1
Qj) +
N∑
j=1
µj+1Qj (4.16)
The KKT condition can be expressed as:
∂L
∂Pi
=
∂Rcoop1
∂Qj
− µ1 + µj+2 = 0 (4.17)
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µ1(PT −
N∑
j=1
Qj) = 0 (4.18)
µj+1Qj = 0;µ1 ≥ 0;µj+1 ≥ 0 (4.19)
Using an approach similar to the previous case, the optimization problem can be
rewritten as:

PT
(Qj + dj)(PT + ej(Qj + dj))
− µ1 = 0
PT −
N∑
j=1
Qj = 0
(4.20)
where dj =
cj
b
and ej =
b
aj
. Eq. 4.21 can be solved using a similar water-filling
approach as described in Algorithm 1.
4.3.2 Coop MIMO network: Scenario 2
In this section, we consider a scenario in which no restriction exists between Desti-
nation D, Source S, and RNs; i.e., they can spontaneously communicate with each
other. As shown in Fig. 4.3, M RNs are deployed and all RNs employ one antenna.
N antennas are assembled with Source S. The destination is a mobile device with
one antenna. Without considering overheads and using similar notation as shown in
scenario 1, we present the following result on the SKGR (which is proved in our earlier
work [41]).
Lemma 6. The SKGR for coop MIMO: scenario 2 corresponds to [41]:
Rcoop2 =
1
T{
I
(
h˜SD; h˜DS
)
+min
{
I
(
H˜SR; H˜RS
)
, I
(
h˜DR; h˜RD
)}} (4.21)
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Figure 4.3: Network model of coop MIMO architecture: Scenario 2
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where, the mutual information terms are:
I
(
h˜SD; h˜DS
)
= −1
2
N∑
j=1
log
[1− σ
2
SjD
TQj
(σ2SjDTQj + 3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
)
σ2SjDTPS
(σ2SjDTPS + 3
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
)
]
(4.22)
I
(
h˜DR; h˜RD
)
= −1
2
M∑
i=1
log
[1− σ
2
DRi
TPi
(σ2DRiTPi + 3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
)
σ2DRiTPD
(σ2DRiTPD + 3
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
)
]
(4.23)
I
(
H˜SR; H˜RS
)
= −1
2
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
log
[1− σ
2
SjRi
TPi
(σ2SjRiTPi + 3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
)
σ2SjRiTQj
(σ2SjRiTQj + 3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
)
]
(4.24)
According to the derived expression of SKGR for Scenario 2 (Eqs. 4.214.224.234.24)
of coop MIMO network reveals that SKGR over all wireless channels is determined
by power allocation and variance of channel estimators. A proper power allocation
scheme can be implemented into the network to maximize SKGR. The power allocation
problem corresponding to scenario 2 can be written as:
maximize
Pi,Qj
∀i=1,...,M ;j=1,...,N
Rcoop2
subject to
N∑
j=1
Qj ≤ PS, Qj ≥ 0
M∑
i=1
Pi ≤ PR, Pi ≥ 0
Since the optimization problem is a challenging max-min optimization problem, we
transfer this problem into an equivalent linear program [68]
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maximize
Pi,Qj
∀i=1,...,M ;j=1,...,N
Z
subject to Z ≤ I1 + I2
Z ≤ I1 + I3
Z ≥ 0
N∑
j=1
Qj ≤ PS, Qj ≥ 0
M∑
i=1
Pi ≤ PR, Pi ≥ 0
A similar alternating maximization method can be applied for this scenario as well.
Assuming equal power at the source, the optimization problem can be transformed as:
maximize
Pi
∀i=1,...,M
Z
subject to Z ≤ I1 + I2
Z ≤ I1 + I3
Z ≥ 0
M∑
i=1
Pi ≤ PR, Pi ≥ 0
Lagrangian form of Z as a function of Pi yields:
L = Z + µ1(I1 + I2 − Z) + µ2(I1 + I3 − Z)
+ µ3(PR −
M∑
i=1
Pi)
(4.25)
59
Therefore, the KKT condition can be written as:
∂L
∂Z
= 1− µ1 − µ2 = 0 (4.26)
∂L
∂Pi
= µ1
∂I2
∂Pi
+ µ2
∂I3
∂Pi
− µ3 = 0 (4.27)
Z ≤ I1 + I2, Z ≤ I1 + I3,
N∑
i=1
Pi ≤ PR (4.28)
µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3 ≥ 0, µ1(Z − I1 − I2) = 0 (4.29)
µ2(Z − I1 − I3) = 0, µ3(
N∑
i=1
Pi − PR) = 0 (4.30)
Eq. 4.27 show that µ3 6= 0. Based on a combination of Eq. 4.27, Eq. 4.29 and Eq.
4.30, it is easy to figure out that:
N∑
i=1
Pi − PR = 0 (4.31)
Therefore, the solution of this optimization problem is determined by the value of µ1
and µ2. According to equation Eq. 4.27 and Eq. 4.29, it is easy to figure out that
0 ≤ µ1, µ2 ≤ 1 and µ1 + µ2 = 1. Three cases emerge for the optimization problem,
namely,
Case 1: µ1 = 1 and µ2 = 0;
Case 2: µ2 = 1 and µ1 = 0;
Case 3: µ1 6= 0 and µ2 6= 0
In the following subsections, we discuss the implications of these three cases.
Case 1: µ1 = 1 and µ2 = 0
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In this case, the optimization function can be rewritten as:
maximize
Pi
∀i=1,...,M
Rcoop2 = I1 + I2
subject to
N∑
i=1
Pi = PR
Pi ≥ 0
Application of Lagrangian form to our optimization problem, we have:
L = Rcoop2 + λ2(PR −
M∑
i=1
Pi) +
M∑
i=1
µiPi (4.32)
The KKT condition can be expressed as:
∂L
∂Pi
=
∂Rcoop1
∂Pi
− λ2 + µi = 0 (4.33)
PR −
M∑
i=1
Pi = 0 (4.34)
µiPi = 0;µi ≥ 0 (4.35)
Similar to the previous case, the optimization problem corresponds to:

PD
(Pi + hi)(PD + ki(Pi + hi))
− λ2 = 0
PR −
M∑
i=1
Pi = 0
(4.36)
where hi =
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
and ki =
3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
σ2D,Ri
T
.
Since Eq. 4.36 is similar in form to Eq. 4.21, it is possible to solve the above opti-
mization problem by exploiting a similar water-filling algorithm as shown in Algorithm
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1.
Case 2: µ2 = 1 and µ1 = 0
In this case, the optimization problem is:
maximize
Pi
∀i=1,...,M
Rcoop2 = I1 + I3
subject to
N∑
i=1
Pi = PR
Pi ≥ 0
Using a similar approach as in the previous case, we can rewrite the optimization
problem as: 
N∑
j=1
Qj
(Pi + oi,j)(Qj + pi,j(Pi + oi,j))
− λ3 = 0
PR −
M∑
i=1
Pi = 0
(4.37)
where oi,j =
3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
σ2Sj,Ri
T
and pi,j =
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
. The solution of Eq. 4.37 can be
solved by exploiting the similar water-filling algorithm.
Case 3: µ1 6= 0 and µ2 6= 0
According to the expression of original ”max-min” optimization problem, only two
options exist for this case: Rcoop2 = I1 + I2 and Rcoop2 = I1 + I3. Therefore, the
optimal power allocation falls into either Case 1 or Case 2.
Comparing above three cases, we select the power allocation (Pj0) corresponding to
the maximum SKGR. Based on Pj0, we calculate the power distribution at the source.
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This optimization problem can be written as follows.
maximize
Qj
∀j=1,...,N
Z
subject to Z ≤ I1 + I2
Z ≤ I1 + I3
Z ≥ 0
N∑
j=1
Qj ≤ PS, Qj ≥ 0
Similar to previous analysis, we have three cases as well.
Case i: µ1 = 1 and µ2 = 0
The optimization problem can be written as:
maximize
Qj
∀j=1,...,N
Rcoop2 = I1 + I2
subject to
M∑
j=1
QJ = PS
Qj ≥ 0
Implementing same approach as shown above, the optimization problem corresponding
to 
PS
(Qj + fj)(PS + gj(Qj + fj))
− λ1 = 0
PS −
N∑
j=1
Qj = 0
(4.38)
where fj =
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
and gj =
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
σ2Sj,D
T
.
A similar water-filling algorithm can be employed to solve this problem.
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Case ii: µ1 = 0 and µ2 = 1
The corresponding optimization problem is:
maximize
Qj
∀j=1,...,N
Rcoop2 = I1 + I3
subject to
M∑
j=1
QJ = PS
Qj ≥ 0
Using the similar approach, we have

PS
(Qj + qj)(PS + rj(Qj + qj))
+
M∑
i=1
Pi
(Qj + si,j)(Pi + ti,j(Qj + si,j))
− λ4 = 0
PS −
N∑
j=1
Qj = 0
(4.39)
where qj =
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
σ2Sj,D
T
, rj =
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Dl
, si,j =
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
σ2Sj,Ri
T
and ti,j =
3M
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Sj,l
3N
∑L
l=1 σ
2
Ri,l
. The
power allocation can be achieved by exploiting water-filling algorithm as well.
Case iii: µ1 6= 0 and µ2 6= 0
As previous analysis shown, the optimal results of case iii should falls into either case
i or case ii.
Therefore, the alternating maximization algorithm for scenario 2 of coop MIMO can
be described as Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 Alternating Maximization Algorithm
0): In the initial state 0, setting Qj0 =
PS
N
,∀j = 1, 2, ..., N as a equal power distribution
at source, the power allocation of relay node (Pi0) can be solved by using water-filling
algorithm. We select the Pis corresponding to the maximum SKGR among the three cases
as Pi0.
1): Calculate the power allocation at the source (Qj1) based on Pi0 by using water-filling
algorithm. The Qjs corresponding to the maximum SKGR are selected as Qj1.
. . .
k): Update Pik based on the Qjk
k + 1): Use Pik to calculate the Qjk+1
. . .
Terminate iterations when ‖Pik+1 − Pik‖2 ≤ ε and ‖Qjk+1 −Qjk‖2 ≤ ε .
4.4 Results
In this section, we provide numerical results related to SKGR with the proposed power
allocation strategies for multiple antenna networks.
4.4.1 SKGR for MIMO network
In this scenario, we assume that two antennas are assigned to both Alice and Bob.
The predefined variances of channel estimators (i.e., σ2A,j and σ
2
B,i, i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2.)
of MIMO network used in simulation are shown in Table 4.1. We set ε = 0.001
[66]. Fig. 4.4 shows a comparison of SKGR in a MIMO network with the proposed
power allocation and equal power distribution. As expected, Fig. 4.4 demonstrates
that our power allocation scheme improves SKGR at the low-power region. However,
SKGR improvement of the power allocation algorithm is less significant with increased
transmit power. This phenomenon can be explained as follows: when transmit power
is low, the power allocation algorithm is forced to assign more power to channels with
better channel quality. On the other hand, equal power distribution case continues
to allocate the same power to each channel. Therefore, our power allocation case
outperforms the equal power distribution case. Nevertheless, when transmit power is
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high, the difference between SKGR due to variance of channel estimator is negligible
[69]. Consequently, SKGR of equal power distribution case is close to that of our
power allocation case.
Table 4.1: The variance of channel estimator of MIMO case
Alice/Bob Antenna #1 Antenna #2
Antenna #1 σ21,1 = 3.6 σ
2
1,2 = 1.1
Antenna #2 σ22,1 = 0.8 σ
2
2,2 = 0.7
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of SKGR with proposed power allocation and SKGR with equal
power distribution for MIMO networks
4.4.2 SKGR for coop MIMO network Scenario 1
In this scenario, we assume that two antennas are employed by the source and two
relay nodes are deployed in the network. Table 4.2 shows variances of channel estima-
tors between source and relay nodes (S-R links) and variances of channel estimators
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between relay nodes and destination (R-D links). A comparison of SKGR performance
with proposed power allocation and equal power distribution is shown in Fig. 4.5 .
It demonstrates performance improvement of our power allocation algorithm at low
transmit power region. An interesting problem occurs when we compare the numeri-
cal result of MIMO networks and Scenario 1 of coop MIMO networks. Results shows
that even with an increase in power to 200 mW, SKGR of the proposed power alloca-
tion approach remains greater than SKGR of equal power distribution case in MIMO
networks. However, for Scenario 1 of coop MIMO networks, SKGR of the proposed
power allocation approach is equal to SKGR of equal power distribution case when
power increases to 70 mW. This phenomenon occurs because Scenario 1 of coop MIMO
networks reduce to a virtual multiple input single output (MISO) network. The vari-
ance of channel estimator between source and destination (S-D Links) is a function
(product) of the variances of channel estimators between S-R links and the variance
of channel estimator between R-D links [41]. Due to the product of the variances
of channel estimators, our choice of channel estimator variances yields a reduction of
the variation of channel estimators between S-D links. Therefore, comparing to the
MIMO case, the performance gap between our power allocation strategy and an equal
power distribution case decreases with increase in power.
Table 4.2: The variance of channel estimator of coop MIMO case: Scenario 1 and Scenario
2
Source, Destination/Relay nodes Relay node #1 Relay node #2
Source #1 σ2S1,R1 = 2.7 σ
2
S1,R2
= 0.9
Source #2 σ2S2,R1 = 0.5 σ
2
S2,R2
= 2.1
Destination σ2D,R1 = 0.7 σ
2
D,R2
= 3.3
4.4.3 SKGR for coop MIMO network Scenario 2
In this scenario, we assume that two antennas are employed by the source and two relay
nodes are deployed in the network. We assume the same channel estimator variances
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of SKGR with proposed power allocation and SKGR with equal
power distribution for coop MIMO networks: Scenario 1
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for S-R and R-D links. The channel estimator variances for S-D links is given in Table
4.3.Fig. 4.6 compares SKGR with the proposed power allocation and equal power
distribution in Scenario 2 of the coop MIMO network. In this scenario, SKGR of
our power allocation method outperforms the SKGR of equal power distribution case
at low transmit power range. A comparison of Fig. 4.5 and Fig. 4.6 shows that
the overall SKGR of Scenario 2 of coop MIMO network is greater than the overall
SKGR of a MIMO network because with the deployment of relay nodes, Scenario 2
of coop MIMO has more common randomness between S-D links compared to MIMO
networks. Therefore, coop MIMO networks has the ability to extract longer secret
keys by exploiting common randomness in wireless channels.
Table 4.3: The variance of channel estimator of coop MIMO case: Scenario 2
Source/Destination Source #1 Source #2
Destination σ2D,S1 = 0.6 σ
2
D,S2
= 3.1
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of SKGR with proposed power allocation and SKGR with equal
power distribution for coop MIMO networks: Scenario 2
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we investigate our proposed power allocation strategies to further
increase the performance of the PHY-SKG technique in multiple-antenna networks.
We present information theoretic results of SKGR in MIMO networks and derive the
corresponding power allocation strategy. Based on previous research in coop MIMO
networks, we propose two novel power allocation strategies for two scenarios, respec-
tively. Theoretical analysis and numerical results demonstrate the effect of our power
allocation strategies on SKGR for multiple-antenna networks. Future work will fo-
cus on two aspects: (1) extending our PHY-SKG scheme to multi-cell coop MIMO
networks, including artificial noise injection and interference alignment techniques,
and (2) considering relay nodes synchronization/overhead cost, to quantify trade-off
between synchronization/overhead cost and SKGR.
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Chapter 5
Chapter 5: Evaluating Node
Reliability in Cooperative MIMO
Networks
Cooperative multiple input multiple output (Co-MIMO) strategies represent one ap-
proach to meet the growing requirements (i.e., higher throughput, enhanced coverage,
low latencies, and reduced cost) of wireless communication services. In Co-MIMO
networks, low power relay nodes (RNs) are recruited by mobile users to cooperate
as virtual antenna arrays. Although Co-MIMO architectures can offer significant im-
provement in both performance and security of wireless networks, they are susceptible
to attacks. In this chapter, we propose a novel node reliability evaluation scheme to en-
hance the security of Co-MIMO networks. Leveraging the probe signal transmissions
involved in physical layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) schemes, two distributed
node level reliability detection methods (one-shot and dynamic) are proposed to detect
relay nodes that are non-cooperative. Based on the fusion of information from relay
nodes, an overall reliability evaluation can be accomplished at a central server. Mo-
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bile users interested in collaboration can access this central server to determine which
nodes to recruit for cooperation. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results are
presented to illustrate the proposed node reliability evaluation schemes.
5.1 Introduction
In order to provide higher data rates, better coverage, and lower latencies, the Long
Term Evolution Advanced (LTE-A) standard incorporates picocells, femtocells, relays,
and remote radio heads within a macro-cell layout. By allowing for cooperation with
low-power relay nodes, LTE-A networks provide an efficient approach to enhance cov-
erage and capacity at low cost. Researchers have proposed the concept of cooperative
MIMO (Co-MIMO) networks [1], where distributed antennas on multiple devices work
together as virtual antenna arrays.
A number of distinguished studies have been conducted on Co-MIMO networks and
demonstrated their performance benefits. Additionally, in our previous research [70]
[71], we demonstrate that Co-MIMO architectures can improve physical layer secu-
rity (e.g., wireless channel reciprocity based physical layer secret key generation) by
providing rich common randomness among wireless channels. Although Co-MIMO
architectures offer benefits in performance and physical layer security, it is still vul-
nerable. In Co-MIMO architectures, mobile users are allowed to recruit relay nodes
(such as idle users, femtocells and picocells) and physical layer secret key generation
schemes (PHY-SKG) are not adequate to protect the communication. While PHY-
SKG provides protection against eavesdropping, it is very difficult to detect misbe-
havior of relay nodes that have already joined the cooperative communication. Selfish
or malicious intentions of relay nodes may manifest as non cooperation. Selfish nodes
may suddenly choose not to cooperate in order to preserve their battery resources
or prioritize other services. Malicious nodes, on the other hand, attempt to prevent
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communication between source and destination nodes at any cost. Note that an ad-
versary may control malicious nodes to attack cooperative networks, i.e., a denial of
service attack at the physical layer. Therefore, understanding how to measure and
monitor the reliability of relay nodes is one of the critical challenges in Co-MIMO
based physical layer security schemes.
In this research, we attempt to address this issue by developing novel node reliabil-
ity evaluation schemes for Co-MIMO networks. The proposed schemes allow us to
generate and regularly update a reliability database that includes information about
all relay nodes and is accessible by mobile users that are interested in cooperation.
The node reliability evaluation used in conjunction with our previously proposed co-
operative PHY-SKG scheme [70], [42] can significantly enhance security of Co-MIMO
networks.
In this work, we propose novel node reliability evaluation schemes to enhance security
of Co-MIMO networks. We are primarily interested in measuring the level of non
cooperation of relay nodes. This type of misbehavior is detected by leveraging the
first stage in our previously proposed PHY layer secret key generation scheme [42,70].
Specifically, consider a practical relay based Co-MIMO network model as shown in
Fig. 2.3. For simplicity, focus on a single communication pair including the trans-
mitter, mobile user and M relay nodes. By utilizing the identical probe signal that is
initially transmitted by all participating nodes in any PHY-SKG scheme, we employ
two distributed node level reliability detection methods: (1) a one-shot instantaneous
reliability detection and (2) a Bayesian framework based dynamic reliability detection
that incorporates history of node behavior. This node level reliability information can
be fused at a central server in order to derive an overall measure of reliability. The
metrics stored in the central server can be accessed by other mobile users who are
interested in recruiting trustworthy nodes for cooperative operations. The proposed
node reliability evaluation scheme used in conjunction with our previously proposed
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cooperative PHY-SKG strategies [42,70] can significantly enhance security of cooper-
ative networks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to address this
important issue in Co-MIMO networks.
5.2 Node Level Reliability Evaluation
Figure 5.1: Node Reliability Evaluation Method
Our proposed one-shot and dynamic node level reliability evaluation schemes are
shown in Fig. 5.1. Assume there are M relay nodes that cooperate to establish
the communication between the transmitter and the mobile user. Prior to data trans-
mission, a secret key is generated based on the process described in Section II. The
first stage of secret key generation involves transmission of probe signals by the trans-
mitter, mobile user and relay nodes. Therefore, at this stage, it is possible to identify
nodes that are non cooperative via sensing their probe signal transmissions or lack
thereof. For example, when the transmitter sends a probe signal to the mobile user,
all the recruited relay nodes should forward their received probe signal to the mobile
user. If any of these nodes refuse to forward, other nodes will not detect transmitted
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power from the malicious nodes. Therefore, in order to detect if a particular relay
node is performing its duty and participating in the cooperative transmission process,
a simple binary hypothesis test based on received power levels can be conducted at
all other nodes in a distributed fashion. For testing the jth relay node, at time slot T ,
we can use the signal received by ith relay node given by:
H0 : Yi =
∑
l
sl +Ni; j
th relay node is not cooperating
H1 : Yi =
∑
l
sl + sj +Ni; j
th relay node is cooperating
(5.1)
where, i, j = 1, . . . ,M and i 6= j. H0 and H1 denote the hypotheses corresponding to
whether the jth relay node is forwarding the probe signal or not; sl, l ∈M \N (N is the
number of non cooperative nodes) denotes the signal received from other cooperating
relay nodes; sj is the received signal from j
th relay node (target node), and Ni is the
additive white Gaussian noise at ith relay node. For simplicity in analysis, we assume
all the noise terms are Gaussian distributed with zero mean and known variance σ2.
Since the probe signals are deterministic signals, we can write the distribution of Yi
as.
Yi =

∼ N(
M\N∑
l=1
sl, σ
2); under H0
∼ N(
M\N∑
l=1
sl + sj, σ
2); under H1
(5.2)
At ith relay node, detected power under both hypotheses corresponds to
Xi = |Yi|2 =

PSi + PNi ∼ σ2χ2(x; 1; δ0); under H0
PSi + Psj + PNi ∼ σ2χ2(x; 1; δ1); under H1
(5.3)
where, PSi is the total received power (except j
th relay node) at ith relay node, PNi
is the noise power at ith relay node, and Psj is the power of the received signal from
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jth relay node. We assume small scale fading power gain hij is i.i.d exponential distri-
bution (Rayleigh fading); the path loss function is given by g (di,j) = ‖di,j‖−α, where
α > 2 is the path loss exponent; d is the distance between communication parties.
Therefore, the received power at the ith relay node, from jth relay node, can be writ-
ten as PTsjhji. ‖dji‖
−α, where PTsj is transmit power of the j
th relay node. Since the
received signal is complex Gaussian as shown in equation (2), the distribution of our
detected power corresponds to a non-central χ2 with degrees of freedom V0/1 = 1 and
noncentrality parameter δ0 = (
∑M
l=1 sl
σ
)2 and δ1 = (
∑M
l=1 sl+sj
σ
)2 (denoted as χ2(x; 1; δ0)
and χ2(x; 1; δ1), respectively). Therefore, each node can perform a binary hypothesis
test based on the likelihood ratio. For example, the ith relay node can compute the
likelihood ratio for the test of the jth node as
li,j =
p1(x)
p0(x)
(5.4)
where, p1(x) and p0(x) are the density function corresponding to χ
2(x; 1; δ0) and
χ2(x; 1; δ1), respectively. These likelihood values serve as the basis of relay node reli-
ability evaluations as explained in the following subsections.
Since every relay node is monitored by other relay nodes, it is important to note that
our power sensing scheme not only works for the case of single non-cooperative node,
but also works for multiple non-cooperative nodes. As we have explained earlier in
this section, for a target node, there are M − 1 pair wise tests performed by other
relay nodes, making it straightforward to extend this approach to detect multiple
non-cooperative relay nodes.
5.2.1 One-shot Reliability Detection
In a one-shot measurement scheme, the task of interest is to decide whether the obser-
vation X (received power) is generated under H0 or H1. Typically, this is accomplished
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by first forming a test statistic (e.g.,log likelihood ratio) and then comparing it with
a predetermined threshold τl as follows.
L(x) = log
p1(x)
p0(x)
H1
R
H0
τl (5.5)
where, L is denoted as log likelihood ratio. If L is invertible, which is the case for the
power sensing problem, the equivalent test is
X
H1
R
H0
τx (5.6)
where, τx = L
−1(τl). In order to determine the threshold and quantify the perfor-
mance of this binary decision process, two metrics namely, probability of detection
PD and probability of false alarm PFA are commonly employed. PD is the probabil-
ity of detecting a signal from the target relay node when it truly is cooperating and
corresponds to PD = Pr {L(x) > τl | H1} = Pr {X > τx | H1} =
∫∞
τx
p1(x)dx where,
p1(x) is the probability density function (pdf) of scaled non-central χ
2 when H1 is
true. That is,
p1(x) = σ
2fX(x; k; δ1)
=
σ2
2
e−(x+δ1)/2
x
δ1
(k/4−1/2)
Ik/1−1(
√
δ1x),
(5.7)
where, Iv(x) is a modified Bessel function of the first kind. PFA is the probability that
the test incorrectly decides that the considered relay node is transmitting and it can
be written as PFA = Pr {L(x) > τl | H0} = Pr {X > τx | H0} =
∫∞
τx
p0(x)dx where,
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p0(x) is the pdf of scaled non-central χ
2 when H0 is true, i.e.,
p0(x) = σ
2fX(x; k; δ0)
=
σ2
2
e−(x+δ0)/2
x
δ0
(k/4−1/2)
Ik/1−1(
√
δ0x)
(5.8)
The optimum decision threshold τx can be found via a Neyman Pearson criterion that
maximizes PD subject to a constraint on PFA [72]. However, this threshold evaluation
is not trivial as there is no easy and accurate way to express the CDF (F (x; k, δ)) of
non-central χ2 distributions [73] required to compute PD and PFA. An approximation
based on the CDF of normal distribution has been proposed in [74]. That is
F (x; k, δ) ≈ Φ(f(x)) (5.9)
where f(x) = (x/k+δ)
h−(1+hp(h−1−0.5(2−h)mp))
h
√
2p(1+0.5mp)
, h = 1 − 2(k+δ)(k+3δ)
3(k+2δ)2
, p = (k+2δ)
(k+δ)2
and m =
(h−1)(1−3h). Therefore, for PFA ≤ α, we require that 1−σ2Φ(f(x)) ≤ α. Thus, we
can approximate the threshold τx as τx = f
−1(Φ−1((1 − α) 1
σ2
)). At each relay node,
either soft or hard decisions can be made. The log likelihood ratio value can be used
as a soft decision metric that quantifies the degree of node non cooperation. For hard
decisions, if the received power greater or equal to τx, the target node is considered as
a cooperative relay node. Otherwise, the target node is deemed to be non-cooperative.
5.2.2 Dynamic Reliability Detection
An alternative approach to evaluating node reliability exploits historical behavior by
relying on a Bayesian framework. Assume that it is possible to associate prior proba-
bilities pi0 and pi1 for the hypotheses H0 and H1. The objective in this framework is to
minimize the so-called Bayesian risk. According to [75], the Bayesian test corresponds
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to,
l(x) =
p1(x)
p0(x)
H1
R
H0
pi0(C10 − C00)
pi1(C01 − C11) (5.10)
where, l is the likelihood ratio; Cij, for i = 0, 1 and j = 0, 1, is the cost incurred
by choosing hypothesis Hi when hypothesis Hj is true; pij is the prior probability
that hypothesis Hj is true unconditioned on the value x. A uniform cost assignment
(C11 = C00 = 0 and C10 = C01 = 1) [76] is employed in this research.
In dynamic reliability detection, at each time instant, in order to minimize the Bayesian
risk, we calculate the posterior probabilities (pi0(x) and pi1(x)) given the power mea-
surement X = x and prior probabilities pi0 and pi1 (initially are assumed to be equally
likely, i.e., pi0 = pi1 = 0.5). In a Bayesian framework, optimum decision is based on
posterior probabilities, and we can think of our proposed dynamic node reliability
metric evaluation scenario as being a mechanism for updating the prior probabilities
of the hypothesis into posterior probabilities. In the next time slot, we employ the
posterior probabilities calculated in previous time slot as the new prior probabilities.
Thus, we can obtain the updated posterior probabilities for time slot 2 and so on.
This process is described in Algorithm 4. The dynamic reliability detection algorithm
involves the update of posterior probabilities by exploiting historical behavior (prior
probabilities) based on a Bayesian framework. The calculated posterior probabilities
are optimal at every step and does not involve any iterative computation. The steps
mentioned in Algorithm 4, refer to time epochs. That is, while the metric is optimal
in each step, over time, we incorporate historical behavior of cooperating nodes.
Similar to the one-shot scenario, both soft and hard decisions can be made in the
dynamic scenario. In each time slot, the likelihood ratio can be employed as the
soft decision statistic that quantifies the degree of node cooperation. Alternately, the
pij(x), j = 0, 1 can be treated as soft decisions characterizing the probability that a
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Algorithm 4 Node Reliability Update Algorithm
Timeslot 0): Assume pi0 = pi1 =
1
2
Timeslot 1): Calculate the posterior probabilities (pij(x), j = 1, 2) based on the prior prob-
abilities using the following equation
pij(x) = P (Hj is true | X = x) = pj(x)pij
pi0p0(x) + pi1p1(x)
(5.11)
Timeslot 2): Let pij = pij(x). Update the posterior probabilities (pij(x), j = 1, 2) using (11)
...
Timeslot t): Set pij based on posterior probabilities from time slot t− 1, calculate posterior
probabilities (pij(x), j = 1, 2) based on (11)
...
Terminate at last time slot.
node is cooperative or not. In the hard decision case, we compare the posterior prob-
abilities (pij(x)) in each time slot. If pi1(x) is greater or equal than pi0(x), we consider
the target node is cooperating. Otherwise, the target node is a non-cooperative node.
5.3 Centralized Reliability Evaluation
An alternative to node based evaluation is a centralized approach for characterizing
reliability. Here, each node transfers their local node reliability information to a central
server (e.g., basestation). It is important to note that the basestation is well suited
to act as a central server in our proposed reliability evaluation scheme. The idea of
reliability information fusion at a basestation is a natural choice in cellular network
since every end user node and/or relay node exchange control plane information with
the basestation on a consistent basis. Additionally, basestations are not typically
power constrained and have adequate computational capacity to fulfill the role of a
central server. Systematic fusion of data or decisions from relay nodes can be used to
derive an overall reliability measure for all nodes in the network. This information is
accessible to all nodes that seek to engage in cooperative communication. As shown in
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Figure 5.2: Centralized Reliability Evaluation Scheme
Fig. 5.2, in a data fusion scenario, relay nodes send the soft decisions, i.e., evaluated
likelihood ratios to the central server. If one-shot reliability detection is deployed at
each relay node independently, it is reasonable to write the likelihood ratio, to test
whether ith relay node is cooperating, as
l(xi) =
p1(xi)
p0(xi)
=
∏N
l=1 p1(xil)∏M−1
l=1 p0(xil)
=
M−1∏
l=1
l(xil) (5.12)
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where, xil is the received signal from l
th relay node at target relay node (ith). l(xi)
is compared to a global threshold (τiG) to decide if the target node is cooperative.
Applying one-shot reliability detection, the overall/global probability of false alarm
corresponds to
PFAG =
∫
l(xi)>τiG
p0(xi)dxi
≈ 1− σ2(M−N)
∏
i
Φ(f(xi)) = g(xi)
(5.13)
Based on a Neyman Pearson criterion where PFAG ≤ αG, the global threshold can be
calculated as τiG = g
−1(αG). In this manner, a global decision can be made at central
server for each relay node. As we mention in section II, the proposed reliability
evaluation scheme is implemented during the probing stage of PHY-SKG scheme.
Therefore,a global decision on node reliability can be made when PHY-SKG scheme
generate new secret keys. The frequency of generating new secret keys depends on
the required security levels and the computational power available at the disposal of
an adversary. If the system has a high security level requirement and/or the system
faces a adversary with high computational power, we may need to generate secret keys
more frequently. This in turn will lead us to a more frequent monitoring/calculation
of node reliability.
In the dynamic case, the relay nodes send the corresponding data (such as prior
probabilities, posterior probabilities and likelihood ratios) to the central server. The
Bayesian test corresponding to the ith relay node can be expressed as:
l(xi) =
p1(xi)
p0(xi)
=
N∏
l=1
p1(xil)
p0(xil)
H1
R
H0
pi0Gi(C10 − C00)
pi1Gi(C01 − C11)
(5.14)
where, pijGi is the overall/global prior probability that hypothesis Hj is true. Thus,
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the posterior probabilities can be calculated as
pi0Gi(xi) =
p0(xi)pi0Gi
pi0Gip0(xi) + pi1Gip1(xi)
;
pi1Gi(xi) =
p1(xi)pi1Gi
pi0Gip0(xi) + pi1Gip1(xi)
(5.15)
Applying a similar algorithm as shown in Algorithm 4, the central server can measure
and monitor the reliability of relay nodes. Alternatively, the central server can also
make a global decision by exploiting the local decision made by each relay node (de-
cision fusion). As shown in Fig. 5.2, in decision fusion scenario, for both of one-shot
and dynamic cases, each relay node makes a local decision (di) and communicates
these decisions to the central server. Therefore, the central server can make a global
decision using standard decision fusion rules such as majority voting, AND and OR
rules [77].
We only consider a centralized scenario in this work. This is because the relay node
reliability evaluation scheme is envisioned for every cooperative relay based transmis-
sion. A single cooperative link typically consists of one transmitter, one receiver, and
a small set of relay nodes. Therefore, the scale of the network considered is not large.
Consequentially, deployed in every single cell of co-op MIMO network. As introduced
in section II, each cell of co-op MIMO network is not a large scale network. Therefore,
a totally distributed implementation is not necessary.
5.4 Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results to illustrate the performance of our
proposed node reliability evaluation schemes. The one-shot node level reliability eval-
uation is completely characterized via PD and PFA given in Eq. ?? and Eq. ??.
Therefore, the simulations mainly focus on the performance of dynamic node relia-
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bility metric evaluation. In all simulations, a two-tier wireless network is considered.
Both relay nodes and mobile users are distributed as homogenous Poisson Point Pro-
cess (PPP) [78] with density λR = 1.5 and density λU = 0.5 (independent of relay
nodes), respectively. The simulations focus on a single communication pair, where the
target mobile user recruits 3 relay nodes. We assume the corresponding power fad-
ing parameter hji follows a exponential distribution with parameter 1 and path loss
exponent α = 4. We implement our proposed dynamic node reliability metric evalu-
ation scheme for 20 time slots and repeat this simulation for 1000 realizations of the
underlying PPP. We investigate two general malicious strategies of relay nodes: (1)
periodic non cooperation and (2) random non cooperation. In addition,we analyze the
reliability performance under different distance distribution between communication
parties.
In a periodic non cooperation scenario, we assume that the target relay node is not co-
operating in the first 5 time slots and works normally in the following 5 time slots. This
node behavior repeats periodically. The performance of our proposed dynamic node
reliability evaluation scheme is shown in Fig. 5.3. Subplot 5.3(a) shows the strategy
of malicious relay nodes. Subplots 5.3(b), 5.3(c) and 5.3(d) indicate the performance
of proposed dynamic node reliability evaluation scheme as a function of time instants
when corresponding relay nodes (such as R1, R2 and R3) are treated as malicious
nodes. In order to illustrate the relationship in a proper way, we use the probability
of cooperation as the performance metric. The simulation results demonstrate that,
in the first 5 time slots, as the relay node is not cooperating, the performance metric
decreases. In the following 5 time slots, the performance metric increases since the
relay node works as expected. The observed variation of our reliability metric can be
attributed to the Bayesian framework that incorporates the past history of relay node
cooperation.
In random non cooperation scenario, we assume that the target relay node behavior
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Figure 5.3: Node reliability evaluation for relay node refuses to work periodically scenario
is random. Fig. 5.4 and 5.5 indicate the performance of the proposed dynamic node
reliability evaluation scheme. In the same manner, Subplot 5(a) indicates the mali-
cious strategy of target relay node. Subplots 5.4(b), 5.4(c) and 5.4(d) represent the
performance of the proposed reliability scheme when the corresponding relay node fol-
lows the malicious strategy. It is obvious that proposed reliability scheme adequately
monitors the misbehavior of target relay nodes even in this random scenario. One
phenomenon we want to point out is that in a certain period of time (such as from
time slot 14 to time slot 18 as shown in Fig. 5.4), the reliability scheme indicates that
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Figure 5.4: Node reliability evaluation for relay node refuses to work randomly scenario
the target relay node is cooperating. However, at time slot 16, the target relay node
does not cooperate as shown in subplot 5.4(a). This momentary non cooperation does
not significantly devalue the node’s reliability metric as the node does show a history
of cooperation prior to and post time slot 16. This feature mimics the evolution of
trust amongst collaborators in a team where momentary non cooperation does not
completely undo a history of positive cooperation. It is, however, incorrect to state
that this history-aware approach fails to detect non cooperation. This is because,
the reliability metric does decrease but does so in a gradual manner. Repeated non
cooperation after maintaining a significant level of cooperation would be required to
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Figure 5.5: Node reliability evaluation for relay node refuses to work randomly scenario
break the trust earned and the reliability metric will degrade. Of course, depending
on the preference of the system manager, one can adjust the rate of degradation of
the reliability metric. For example, the classical Bayesian framework can be adapted
to include “weights” that reflect a “forgetting” factor. This approach can ensure that
the history of cooperation is not valued highly and momentary non cooperation will
be immediately reflected in a poor reliability metric.
Since our node reliability evaluation scheme is based on a power sensing algorithm,
both distance between relay nodes and transmit signal strength will impact the re-
ceived power. For example, consider a scenario where the reliability of relay node A
is being evaluated by relay node B and C that are at different distance from A. B
and C node will arrive at different reliability metric values for node A. This vari-
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Figure 5.6: Relationship between distance distribution and reliability performance
ability further motivates the value of fusing reliability information at a central serve
(e.g., at the basestation). This phenomenon is demonstrated in the simulation results.
From Figs. 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, we can observe that the exact performances metric (e.g.,
probability of cooperation) of dynamic node reliability evaluation schemes can vary
widely depending on the target relay node. This is due to the variation in distance
distribution among relay nodes that in turn impacts the received signal strengths that
guide the power sensing based decision process. In order to present the relationship
between reliability performance and distance distribution, we vary the relay node spa-
tially distribution, Poisson point process (PPP), density (λR) from 0.5 to 2. The
performance of node reliability evaluation scheme with different distance distributions
are shown in Fig. 5.6. Subplot 5.6(a) presents the malicious behavior of target re-
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lay node. Subplot 5.6(b) provides the reliability metric across the same time frame.
As plot 5.6(b) indicates, increasing the density λR of PPP significantly improves the
performance of reliability scheme. This is because the higher distribution density
leads to a smaller distance between relay nodes and stronger received signals for the
power sensing algorithm. In contrast, with increasing distance between relay nodes,
the received power decreases, making it challenging for the power sensing algorithm
to distinguish between background noise and the transmitted signals.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose novel relay node reliability evaluation schemes, including
node level reliability detection and centralized reliability metric evaluation, for use in
Co-MIMO networks. The reliability metrics stored in the central server can be used
as a guide for mobile users interested in collaboration with relay nodes. Theoretical
analysis and simulation results are presented to illustrate the proposed node reliability
evaluation schemes. The reliability evaluation scheme used in conjunction with our
previously proposed cooperative PHY-SKG strategies [42,70] can significantly enhance
security of cooperative networks. Future work will focus on a more general scenario of
misbehavior of relay nodes, built on time delay distribution of internal links estimated
via network tomography.
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Chapter 6
Chapter 6: Network Tomography
based Node Reliability Evaluation
in Cooperative MIMO Networks
Cooperative multiple input multiple output (co-op MIMO) networks proposed as one
potential solution to meet our growing data rate requirements, allow mobile users to
recruit low-power relay nodes to cooperate as virtual antenna arrays. Although co-op
MIMO architectures offer significant performance improvement compared to tradi-
tional wireless networks, they are vulnerable to attacks. In this chapter, we propose
a novel node reliability evaluation scheme that is based on the internal link charac-
teristics among the cooperating nodes. While monitoring internal link characteristics
such as link delay is usually challenging, we propose an active probe signal driven net-
work tomography to estimate these characteristics based on end-to-end measurements.
Specifically, by leveraging the probe signal transmissions involved in our previously
proposed physical layer secret key generation schemes, we measure end-to-end delay in
a coop MIMO network. Then, an expectation maximization (EM) algorithm is used to
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derive a maximum likelihood estimate of the individual internal link delay characteris-
tics. The effectiveness of the proposed node reliability evaluation is demonstrated via
simulations of a single and two layer co-op MIMO network architecture. Simulation
results demonstrate that our proposed node reliability evaluation scheme accurately
identifies non-cooperative nodes.
6.1 Introduction
To meet the growing demand for wireless services, future 5G networks, must provide
higher data rates, lower latency, enhanced security, reduced operating cost, multi-
antenna support, flexible bandwidth operation, and seamless integration with existing
systems. Cooperative multiple input multiple output (co-op MIMO) networks [1] [2],
currently incorporated into 4G LTE , offer one potential solution for meeting these
challenges [3]. A co-op MIMO network typically utilizes distributed antennas on mul-
tiple radio devices in order to boost network throughput, conserve energy, and improve
network coverage. Co-op MIMO fundamentally groups multiple devices into virtual
antenna arrays (VAAs) in order to emulate MIMO communications. A co-op MIMO
transmission involves multiple points-to-point radio links, including links within a
VAA and links between various VAAs. In practice, many wireless devices may not be
able to support multiple antennas due to dimension, budget, and hardware limitations.
Co-op MIMO networks allow these devices to reap the benefits provided by MIMO
networks. Although a number of distinguished studies have focused on ways to im-
prove wireless network performance by exploiting co-op MIMO architecture [4] [2] [1],
security issues have often been overlooked.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels and the open architecture of co-op
MIMO networks, these networks are threatened by eavesdropping, message modifi-
cation, and node impersonation. Previous research [20] [11] [5] indicate that tradi-
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tional key-based enciphering techniques are limited by key distribution and computa-
tional complexity. Following the distinguished work by Shannon [58], wireless channel
reciprocity-based physical layer secret key generation (PHY-SKG) techniques, which
can generate keys with an information theoretic guarantee, have garnered attention
in the wireless security community. In our previous research [70] [42] [43], we demon-
strate that co-op MIMO architectures can improve physical layer security (e.g., wireless
channel reciprocity-based PHY-SKG) by providing rich common randomness among
wireless channels. Although co-op MIMO network provides benefits to performance
and physical layer security, it is still vulnerable. Even if the transmitted information
is secured, it is difficult but essential to monitor the behavior of relay nodes since mo-
bile users are allowed to recruit relay nodes (i.e., idle users, femtocells, and picocells)
during communication. Selfish or malicious intentions of relay nodes may manifest as
non-cooperation. Selfish nodes may suddenly choose not to cooperate in order to pre-
serve their resources or prioritize other services. Malicious nodes, on the other hand,
may attempt to prevent communication between source and destination nodes at any
cost, and an adversary may control malicious nodes in order to attack cooperative
networks (i.e., denial of service attack at the physical layer). Therefore, understand-
ing how to measure and monitor relay node reliability is one of the critical challenges
in co-op MIMO architecture-based physical layer security schemes. In our previous
research[Our under review paper], we propose a node reliability evaluation scheme
based on power sensing. In this chapter, we attempt to evaluate relay node reliability
based on internal link delay. However, internal link behavior between relay nodes in
a co-op MIMO network is difficult to characterizeas only end-to-end measurements
are typically available. Fortunately, sophisticated methods of active network probing
or passive traffic monitoring can generate network statistics that indirectly relate to
required performance metrics. Consequently, we can apply inference techniques, de-
rived in the context of other statistical inverse problems, in order to extract the hidden
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information of interest. Network tomography, a new method is considered a promising
alternative to internal link delay estimation [79]. In this chapter, we demonstrate the
feasibility of evaluating relay node reliability based on network tomography. Addition-
ally, the node reliability evaluation used in conjunction with our previously proposed
cooperative PHY-SKG scheme [70] [42] [43] can significantly enhance security of co-op
MIMO networks.
In this research, we propose a new method to evaluate and characterize node reliability
within a co-op MIMO architecture. While other performance criteria may be used, in
this chapter, we focus on measuring node reliability via estimates of internal link delay.
An active network tomography is implemented to estimate internal link delay based on
measurement of end-to-end delays. It is easy to collect end-to-end delay measurements
by leveraging the probing stage in our proposed PHY-SKG scheme [70] [42] [43]. Since
link delays and occurrences of dropped packets are inherently random, it is reasonable
to model the delays at each link as a independent multinomial distribution. An EM
algorithm is developed for determining the maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs)
of the delay distribution of internal links. Both theoretical analysis and simulation
results are provided to demonstrate the performance of our proposed node reliability
evaluation schemes. The results demonstrate that the proposed scheme accurately
identifies the non-cooperative node. In addition, the proposed node reliability evalua-
tion scheme used in conjunction with our previously proposed cooperative PHY-SKG
strategies [70] [42] [43] can provide a cross-layer security scheme to significantly en-
hance security of cooperative networks.
6.2 Network Tomography
Network tomography is considered a potential approach to monitor large-scale net-
works. Network tomography is a statistical methodology to infer internal link char-
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acteristics by exploiting observed end-to-end characteristics. Compared to the tradi-
tional expensive direct measurement method, network tomography allows for a cheap,
indirect way to monitor large-scale networks without impacting network load. [79]
presents an excellent overview of network tomography and recent developments in the
area. Implementation of network tomography in order to infer internal network char-
acteristics is illustrated in [80]. In this section, we describe how network tomography
can be used in the context of co-op MIMO networks.
A wireless network with a tree topology is shown in Fig. 6.1. The root node represents
the base-station, the leaf nodes denote the end users, and the other nodes are relay
nodes deployed to assistant connection between the base-station and end users. We
consider a connection between two nodes to be a path. We define a link as a direct
connection with no intermediate nodes, thereby allowing a path to consist one or more
links, e.g., a path between the root node and a end user may consist of three links.
Depending on the problem and level of abstraction, the links can be unidirectional or
bidirectional. Information is exchanged by sending signals along a path from base-
station to end users.
Two forms of network tomography are considered in the research community: network
delay tomography [81] and traffic demand tomography [82]. Network delay tomogra-
phy focuses on estimation of link-level characteristics, consisting of counts of packets
transmitted and/or received between source and destination nodes or time delays be-
tween packet transmissions and receptions based on end-to-end measurements. The
goal of network delay tomography is to estimate the loss rate or queuing delay on each
link. Traffic demand tomography primarily focuses on predicting end-to-end path-
level traffic intensities (i.e., how much traffic originated from a specified node and
was destined for a specified receiver) based on link-level traffic measurements such as
counts of packets that pass through nodes in the network. Based on characteristics of
each tomography, we can also classify network tomography as active tomography and
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Figure 6.1: Four-leaf tree topology
passive tomography [83], respectively. In active tomography, we actively probe the
network by sending signals from a base-station to several end users, and end-to-end
path-level performance information is easily collected. The goal of active tomography
is to estimate individual link-level information by exploiting path-level information.
However, probing in active tomography may disturb normal network traffic. In pas-
sive tomography, we infer network performance information from passive observations
of normal network traffic. The most common application is estimation of the origin-
destination traffic matrix of a network [81]. Compared to active tomography, passive
tomography does not introduce wasteful traffic. However, it does inevitably waste lim-
ited computation and storage resources and causes delays [84] because there is a need
to collect large amounts of traffic data in order to derive performance information. In
addition, passive tomography is not suitable for dynamic networks.
In this chapter, we are interested in reliability evaluation of relay nodes in co-op
MIMO networks that can be dynamic in nature. Therefore, we restrict our attention
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to active tomography. Additionally, our previously proposed PHY-SKG scheme lends
itself naturally to probe-based active tomography. In PHY-SKG, we implement an
active probing step in order to generate secret keys by exploiting randomness between
wireless channels. Therefore, we can collect corresponding data (such as end-to-end
delay measurements) from the probing step in the PHY-SKG to avoid disturbing
the regular network traffic. Since link delays and occurrences of dropped packets
are inherently random, statistical methodologies for large-scale network inference and
tomography is preferred. In general, the network tomography problem can be roughly
approximated via a linear model:
Y = AX + δ (6.1)
where X is the vector of independent but unobserved internal delays over each internal
link with dimension of L×1 (as shown in Fig. 6.2(a)) and Y is the vector of observed
path-level delays (as shown in Fig. 6.2(b)) at each end receiver with a dimension of
P ×1(P < R). A is P ×L routing matrix with elements 0 or 1 determined by network
topology; δ is a noise vector with zero mean and finite variance.
A toy example to illustrate our approach is given as follows. As shown in Fig. 6.1,
probe signals are sent from root node (base-station) to leaf nodes (end users) through
a four-leaf tree topology. Let Xi denote the link delay for each internal link. Y1 to Y4
96
represents end-to-end delays from root node to leaf nodes, respectively, resulting in

Y1
Y2
Y3
Y4

=

1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1


X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7

+

δ1
δ2
δ3
δ4

(6.2)
The goal of active network tomography is to estimate the distribution of X given
independent observations from the distribution of Y. It is easy to observe that L is
usually much larger than P in co-op MIMO networks and the problem is ill-posed for
matrix inversion.
6.3 Estimation of Internal Links Delay Distribu-
tion in Cooperative MIMO Networks
As mentioned in Section II, our research focuses on active network tomography where
delay distribution of internal links are considered to reflect the reliability of relay
nodes. Therefore, in this section, we concentrate on estimating delay distribution of
internal links by exploiting network tomography.
We transfer the physical network model shown in Fig. 2.3 into a graph model, as
presented in Fig. 6.2(a). In this specific cell, we assume that R relay nodes and P
end receivers are deployed. Fig. 6.2(b) shows the logic network model (path level) of
the co-op MIMO network. By leveraging the probing stage of our previously proposed
PHY-SKG scheme, we are able to identify network topology and to collect delay dis-
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tributions from end-to-end users simultaneously without increasing redundancy such
as overheads. Based on the knowledge of network topology (Matrix A) and delay
distributions from end-to-end users, it is feasibly to implement an active network to-
pography to infer the delay distribution of internal links, which can be used as an
indicator of reliability of corresponding relay nodes. Comparison of the original delay
distribution with respective estimated delay distribution of each internal link allows
us to scale difference as the reliability metric of corresponding relay node. Details of
an active network tomography scheme are shown as below.
Figure 6.2: (a) graph model of co-op MIMO networks. (b) logic model of co-op MIMO
networks.
In general, the network tomography problem can be roughly approximated as a linear
model as mentioned in Section II (without considering noise):
Y = AX (6.3)
In previous research [85], elements in X, Xl, are assigned from finite possible values
[0, q, 2q, ...,mq], where q is bin width and m is a constant. Therefore, Xl is a discrete
random variable whose possible values are [0, q, 2q, ...,mq] with probability of pl =
[pl0, pl1, pl2, ..., plm]. Therefore we can write Xl as
Xl ∼ fl(pl) (6.4)
where fl is the probability mass function (pmf).
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In order to infer link-level delay of each internal link, our goal is to find a maximum
likelihood of pl. However, a direct calculation of MLE is not feasiable. This is because,
while Y is observed, pl is a probability distribution of unobserved parameters X.
Therefore, we treat this problem as a missing data problem. We assume Z as the
complete data, including X and Y. The likelihood function of complete data can be
expressed as
l(Z; p) = l(X,Y; p) = f(Y | X)l(X; p) (6.5)
where f(Y | X) is the conditional probability density function (pdf) of Y given X
and l(X; p) is the likelihood function of X. Since the pdf does not depend on param-
eter p, if we are able to measure the unobserved data, then the maximum likelihood
estimators we seek will be trivially obtained by maximizing the complete data likeli-
hood. Therefore, maximization of l(X; p) should be equivalent to the solution that
maximizes l(Z; p). We solve the MLEs of l(X; p) instead of l(Y; p) in this problem.
We model Xi as a multinomial distribution with K bins, with the pmf corresponding
to
p(X | p) =
K∏
k=1
pXkk . (6.6)
Considering a scenario with T time slots, we have T independent observations. There-
fore, the likelihood l(X; p) is
l(X1, . . . ,XT | p) =
T∏
t=1
L∏
l=1
K∏
k=1
pXltklk =
L∏
l=1
K∏
k=1
p
∑T
t=1Xltk
lk (6.7)
and log-likelihood corresponds to
L(X1, . . . ,XT | p) =
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
(
T∑
t=1
1Xlt=kq) log plk (6.8)
We assume nlk =
∑T
t=1 1Xlt=kq is the number of packets (out of all packet pair mea-
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surements) that experience a delay of k on link l.
In order to arrive at the MLEs, an expectation maximization (EM) algorithm is imple-
mented. Let pi be the parameter estimated in the ith step of EM algorithm. Therefore,
the target function to be maximized in the pi+1 step is
Q(pi,pi+1) =
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
log plkEpi(
T∑
t=1
1Xlt=kq | Yt) (6.9)
The E-step corresponds to
n˜lk = Epi
[
T∑
t=1
1Xlt=kq | Yt
]
(6.10)
The M-step is to update pi by
pi+1lk =
n˜lk∑
r∈R n˜lr
(6.11)
where R = {0, 1. . . . ,m,∞}. Therefore, the EM algorithm can be summarized as
follows:
Algorithm 5 Expectation Maximization Algorithm
1: procedure EM
2: Initialize p0 and generate delay distribution of end-to-end node Yt using p
0
3: for each link do
4: for each bin do
5: compute n˜lk = Epi(
∑T
t=1 1Xlt=kq | Yt)
6: update p1lk =
n˜lk∑
r∈R n˜lr
7: end for
8: end for
9: Iterate the above steps until converge
10: end procedure
Previous research [79] indicates that the likelihood computation involves high order
convolution, that is computationally expensive, especially when the dimension of X
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is high. [86] propose a pseudo likelihood approach to decrease computational expense
by forming simple subproblems and constructing a product of marginal likelihood
of subproblems by ignoring their dependencies, resulting in a good balance between
computational complexity and statistical efficiency of the parameter estimation. [87]
proposes a novel mixture model for link delays and develops a fast algorithm for
estimation based on the general method of moments. [88] propose a new estimation
approach for solving a class of inverse problems in network tomography based on
marginal distributions of a sequence of one-dimensional linear projections of observed
data. Fortunately, implementation of network tomography in co-op MIMO networks
does not suffer from this computational complexity problem. Although, co-op MIMO
networks are consider to be large-scale networks, the entire network can be divided
into small co-op networks, as shown in Fig. 2.3. Therefore, the above simple delay
estimation scheme can be deployed to each small network in order to avoid high
computational complexity.
6.4 Reliability Evaluation
In order to determine if a node is cooperative, we use a decision statistic that is a func-
tion of the distance D between estimated pˆ and the “nominal/true” delay distribution
pt. We can use different measures such as L1, L2 and Kullback-Leibler distance to
calculate D. That is DL1 = |pˆ− pt| or DL2 = ‖pˆ− pt‖ or DKL =
∑
i pˆ(i) log
pˆ(i)
pt(i)
.
The binary hypothesis test then corresponds to
H0 : D ≤ τ ; target node is cooperative
H1 : D > τ ; target node is non-cooperative
(6.12)
In order to determine the decision threshold τ , we can use a Neyman Pearson criterion
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where we limit the probability of false alarm and maximize probability of detection.
This approach requires knowledge of the distribution of the decision statistic under
Ho and H1. For some measures such as the L2 distance, the asymptotically properties
of MLE can be used to infer that D is asymptotically normal with mean 0 under H0
and non-zero mean d under H1.
6.5 Simulation Results
In this section we present simulation results to illustrate the performance of our pro-
posed node reliability evaluation schemes. Two network models, shown in Fig. 6.3,
are investigated: (1) simple co-op network and (2) multi-layer co-op network.
Figure 6.3: (a) a simple co-op network model. (b) a multi-layer co-op network.
Since we primarily focus on evaluating reliability of relay nodes, it is reasonable to
assume that base-station is a reliable node. Based on this assumption, all the internal
links which connect to the base-station are considered as reliable links. Therefore, if
we detect any abnormal delay distribution from a specific link other than these links,
the corresponding relay node (i.e., subroot relay node connected by the link) can be
detected as a non-cooperative node. For the simple cooperative network, we assume
that one layer of relay nodes (two node) are deployed in order to assist communication
between base-station and end user, as shown in Fig. 6.3.(a). Since the base-station
is treated as reliable node (link 1 and link 2 should be reliable links), we only focus
on estimate the delay distribution of Link 3 and Link 4. Thus, for each internal link
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we assume the bin width q = 1, and the number of bins is set to 3. The initial values
of delay distribution of each link are : p03 = [2/15, 7/15, 6/15], p
0
4 = [9/18, 3/18, 6/18].
We set the true delay distribution of each link to be pt3 = [1/7, 2/7, 4/7], pt4 =
[2/5, 2/5, 1/5]. Therefore, based on these prior knowledge, in order to estimate the
delay distribution of each internal link, an EM algorithm is applied.
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Figure 6.4: Performance of proposed network tomography (estimated delay distribution)
Fig. 6.4 shows delay distribution estimates of the two internal links along with their
true delay distribution in one of the 50 independent simulations. 6.4 demonstrates the
accurately identification of our proposed internal delay distribution estimation scheme
for a simple co-op network. Table 6.1 shows the L1 error norm of estimated delay
Table 6.1: Averaged L1 norm error of estimated delay distribution
Links L1 norm error
Link 3 0.0417
Link 4 0.0012
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distribution for each link, as averaged over 50 independent simulations. For each link,
the L1 error norm is simply the sum of the absolute differences between probability
estimates and true probabilities. As a common measure of the performance of density
estimates, the L1 error norm enjoys several theoretical advantages, as discussed in [89].
The plot shows that the proposed network tomography technique demonstrate good
estimation performance for tracking link delay distributions in a simple co-op network
scenario.
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Figure 6.5: Estimated delay distribution of non cooperative scenario (Link 2)
In order to demonstrate node reliability evaluation of our proposed scheme, we assume
that link 4 has an abnormal delay distribution: pt4 = [2/5, 1/5, 2/5]. The estimated
delay distribution of internal links along with their true delay distribution are shown
in Fig. 7. As shown in the figure, our algorithm accurately estimates the abnormal
delay distribution of link 4.
Table 6.2 illustrates the distance between estimated delay distribution of a simple
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cooperative network (link 4 is the abnormal link) in cooperative and non-cooperative
scenarios by measuring in L1 norm, L2 norm, and absolute KullbackLeibler (KL)
distance. All measurements demonstrate a significant difference at link 4 providing us
the ability to identify the non cooperative node as relay node 2.
Table 6.2: Reliability Evlauation
Links L1 norm error L1 norm error Absolute KL distance
Link 3 0.0668 0.0466 0.0316
Link 4 0.3967 0.2798 0.1377
For the multi-layer co-op network, we assume that two layers of relay nodes (two nodes
at each layer) are deployed to assist communication between the base-station and end
user. As shown in Fig. 6.3(b), we attempt to infer delay distribution of 4 internal
links since the base-station is considered as a reliable node. Thus, for each internal
link we assume that the bin width to be q = 1, and the number of bins is set to
3. The initial value of delay distributions of each link are : p03 = [5/15, 2/15, 8/15],
p04 = [9/19, 4/19, 6/19], p
0
5 = [2/11, 6/11, 3/11], and p
0
6 = [4/17, 5/17, 8/17]. We set
the real delay distribution of each link to be pt3 = [3/8, 1/8, 4/8], pt4 = [5/9, 2/9, 2/9],
pt5 = [1/7, 4/7, 2/7], and pt6 = [3/11, 2/11, 6/11]. Based on these prior knowledge,
in order to estimate the delay distribution of each internal link, an EM algorithm is
implemented.
Fig. 6.6 shows delay distribution estimates of four internal links along with their
true delay distribution in one of the 50 independent simulations. Based on our prior
knowledge that link 4 and link 6 work properly, Fig. 6.6 demonstrates that our
proposed node reliability evaluation scheme performs good for multi-layer co-op MIMO
networks as well. Table 6.3 shows the L1 error norm of estimated delay distribution
for each link, as averaged over 50 independent simulations. The plot shows that the
proposed network tomography technique demonstrate a good estimation performance
for tracking link delay distributions in multi-layer co-op network scenario as well.
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Figure 6.6: Performance of proposed network tomography (estimated delay distribution)
Table 6.3: Averaged L1 norm error of estimated delay distribution
Links L1 norm error
Link 3 0.0016
Link 4 0.0008
Link 5 0.0003
Link 6 0.0020
Similar to the simple co-op MIMO scenario, in order to demonstrate node reliability
evaluation of our proposed scheme for multi-layer co-op MIMO, we assume that link
5 has an abnormal delay distribution: pt5 = [1/9, 5/9, 3/9]. The estimated delay dis-
tribution of internal links along with their true delay distribution are shown in Fig.
6.7. As shown in the figure, our algorithm accurately estimated delay distribution of
internal links. Table ?? illustrates the distance between estimated delay distribution
of a multi-layer cooperative network (link 5 is the abnormal link) in cooperative and
non-cooperative scenarios by measuring in L1 norm, L2 norm and, absolute Kullback-
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Figure 6.7: Estimated delay distribution of non cooperative scenario (Link 3)
Leibler (KL) distance. All measurements demonstrate a significant difference at link
5 providing us the ability to identify the non cooperative node as node 3.
Table 6.4: Reliability Evlauation
Links L1 norm error L1 norm error Absolute KL distance
Link 3 0.0013 0.0009 0.0007
Link 4 0.0018 0.0013 0.0009
Link 5 0.0955 0.0594 0.0442
Link 6 0.0032 0.0021 0.0016
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose an innovative reliability evaluation scheme for relay nodes
within a co-op MIMO architecture. We employ internal link delay distribution as the
measurement for node reliability. In order to estimate/infer internal link characteris-
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tics, we implement an active probing network tomography by exploiting end-to-end de-
lay characteristics. These delay characteristics can be collected by leveraging the probe
signal transmissions involved in PHY-SKG schemes. Based on measuring end-to-end
delays, we estimate the internal link delay characteristics via a maximum likelihood
approach. An EM algorithm is developed to maximize the log-likelihood. Simulation
results illustrate the applicability of the proposed reliability evaluation scheme for two
scenarios of co-op MIMO networks. Results demonstrate that our proposed reliability
evaluation scheme accurately identifies the non-cooperative node in both scenarios.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter concludes the dissertation with a summary of research results and future
research directions.
7.1 Summary
This dissertation proposes novel PHY-SKG strategies for co-op MIMO networks to
address the low SKGR issues (the primary limitation of the PHY-SKG scheme) . In
order to further improve the security level of dynamic wireless networks, innovative
reliability evaluation schemes are proposed to measure and monitor the behavior of
relay nodes using power sensing and network tomography. The proposed node reli-
ability evaluation schemes used in conjunction with proposed cooperative PHY-SKG
strategies represent a novel cross-layer security protocol that can significantly enhance
security of cooperative networks. Key research contributions of this dissertation are
summarized as below.
– The co-op MIMO structure is exploited to design and implement a physical layer
(PHY-layer) security scheme for LTE-A networks. Specifically, two relay-based
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co-op MIMO architectures are considered, and novel PHY-SKG schemes are pro-
posed for those cases.
– A physical layer security scheme for point-to-point networks is introduced, and
this scheme is extended to MIMO networks. Two practical relay-based co-op
MIMO architectures and corresponding PHY-SKG schemes are presented. For
both the MIMO and co-op MIMO networks, the impact of proposed power allo-
cation on SKGR is quantified via theoretical and numerical analysis.
– A novel node reliability evaluation scheme is proposed to enhance the security of
co-op MIMO networks. Leveraging probe signal transmissions involved in PHY-
SKG schemes, two distributed node level reliability detection methods (one-shot
and dynamic) are proposed to detect relay nodes that are non-cooperative. Based
on the fusion of information from relay nodes, an overall reliability evaluation
can be accomplished at base station. Mobile users interested in collaboration can
access this information to determine which nodes to recruit for cooperation.
– A novel node reliability evaluation scheme based on internal link characteristics
among cooperating nodes is proposed. While monitoring internal link charac-
teristics such as link delay is usually challenging, an active probe signal driven
network tomography is proposed to estimate these characteristics based on end-
to-end measurements (by leveraging probe signal transmissions involved in pre-
viously proposed PHY-SKG schemes). An EM algorithm is employed to derive a
maximum likelihood estimation of individual internal link delay characteristics.
Based on the research accomplished in this dissertation, future research directions are
highlighted in the next section.
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7.2 Future Work
Many open problems exist in the domain of MIMO and co-op MIMO based SKG
schemes and node reliability evaluation schemes. This dissertation provides a brief
overview of a few selected approaches, the associated key generation rates and corre-
sponding node reliability evaluation schemes. However, no security scheme is foolproof
and no security protocol is completely secure. Our proposed physical layer security
schemes have weaknesses as well. Some drawbacks of our approach and how the
proposed schemes can be attacked are briefly introduced in this subsection. Based
on these vulnerabilities, a plethora of new problems and a rich set of fundamental
questions could still be addressed. A subset of possible directions is presented below.
– As we mentioned in Chapter 1, theoretically, eavesdroppers experience indepen-
dent physical channels from legitimate users as long as they are a few wavelengths
away from legitimate nodes. However, in practical experiment [], researcher claim
that eavesdroppers are able to estimate a partial amount of CSI. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that eavesdroppers can estimate the entire CSI, thereby
eavesdropping transmitted information between communication parties. Conse-
quentially, how to minimize the leaked information is one of the topic that we
are interested in.
– Interference attack is considered as one of the most dangerous attack for wireless
communication. Instead of eavesdropping transmitted information, the attacker
is trying to terminate the wireless communication by injecting strong interfer-
ence/noise. It is very difficult to prevent this kind of attack; however, for SKG
via wireless fading channel, interference enhances the variation of wireless fad-
ing channel and increases common randomness between communication parties.
Therefore, it is reasonable to investigate how to utilize to increase SKGR by ap-
plying advanced interference alignment techniques or artificial noise/interference
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injection techniques. In addition, large-scale networks such as multi-cell co-op
MIMO networks which are suffered by the interference can reap the benefits of
this topic as well.
– In this dissertation, the assumption is made that Eve, as an eavesdropper, is
a passive attacker. Based on this assumption, SKG strategies were proposed
to protect communication between parties. However, if active eavesdroppers
are present in the communication system, the proposed security schemes may
fail. Therefore, topics concerning physical layer security schemes for wireless
communication under active attack are beneficial for further research.
– As illustrated in this dissertation, common randomness and subsequent SKGR
can be enhanced by exploiting co-op MIMO schemes. However, implementation
of any co-op MIMO scheme requires local communication and synchronization
overhead. Therefore, a trade-off exists between cost for cooperation as captured
via synchronization/overhead costs and SKG performance. How to balance this
trade-off may be a potential direction for future research.
– In this dissertation, the assumption is made that the base station and end users
are considered to be reliable nodes. Based on this assumption, determining which
relay nodes are non-cooperative nodes is relatively easy. However, if an attacker
can hack the basestation or end user, how can we protect the entire communi-
cation network? Therefore, a more intelligent method is needed to locate mis-
behaving nodes based on non-cooperative links when base station and end node
user are treated as potential selfish or malicious nodes.
– How to implement machine learning and artificial intelligence techniques into the
proposed reliability evaluation schemes to automatically detect and locate the
non-cooperative relay node is a problem that is worth investigating.
112
Bibliography
[1] A. Nosratinia, T. Hunter, and A. Hedayat, “Cooperative communication in wire-
less networks,” Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 42, no. 10, pp. 74–80, Oct
2004.
[2] D. Nguyen and M. Krunz, “Cooperative mimo in wireless networks: recent de-
velopments and challenges,” Network, IEEE, vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 48–54, July 2013.
[3] C.-X. Wang, F. Haider, X. Gao, X.-H. You, Y. Yang, D. Yuan, H. Aggoune,
H. Haas, S. Fletcher, and E. Hepsaydir, “Cellular architecture and key technolo-
gies for 5g wireless communication networks,” Communications Magazine, IEEE,
vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 122–130, February 2014.
[4] H. Taoka, S. Nagata, K. Takeda, Y. Kakishima, X. She, and K. Kusume, “Mimo
and comp in lte-advanced,” NTT DOCOMO Technical Journal, vol. 12, no. 2,
pp. 20–28, 2012.
[5] A. Mukherjee, S. Fakoorian, J. Huang, and A. Swindlehurst, “Principles of phys-
ical layer security in multiuser wireless networks: A survey,” Communications
Surveys Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 1550–1573, Third 2014.
[6] M. Bloch, J. Barros, M. Rodrigues, and S. McLaughlin, “Wireless information-
theoretic security,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 54, no. 6,
pp. 2515–2534, June 2008.
[7] F. Osorio, “State of wireless security implementations in the united states and
europe - empirical data,” in Malicious and Unwanted Software, 2008. MALWARE
2008. 3rd International Conference on, Oct 2008, pp. 92–97.
113
[8] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. Petropulu, and H. Poor, “Improving wireless physical layer
security via cooperating relays,” Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 58,
no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, March 2010.
[9] A. Pierrot and M. Bloch, “Strongly secure communications over the two-way
wiretap channel,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 595–605, Sept 2011.
[10] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 54,
pp. 1355–1387, 1975.
[11] U. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common informa-
tion,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 733–742,
May 1993.
[12] A. Khisti and G. W. Wornell, “Secure transmission with multiple antennas i: The
misome wiretap channel,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 56,
no. 7, pp. 3088–3104, July 2010.
[13] F. Oggier and B. Hassibi, “The secrecy capacity of the mimo wiretap channel,”
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 57, no. 8, pp. 4961–4972, Aug
2011.
[14] I. Csiszar and J. Korner, “Broadcast channels with confidential messages,” Infor-
mation Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339–348, May 1978.
[15] R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszar, “Common randomness in information theory and
cryptography. i. secret sharing,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, Jul 1993.
[16] S. Ur Rehman, K. Sowerby, C. Coghill, and W. Holmes, “The analysis of rf
fingerprinting for low-end wireless receivers with application to ieee 802.11a,”
in Mobile and Wireless Networking (iCOST), 2012 International Conference on
Selected Topics in, July 2012, pp. 24–29.
114
[17] S. Rehman, K. Sowerby, and C. Coghill, “Radio-frequency fingerprinting for mit-
igating primary user emulation attack in low-end cognitive radios,” Communica-
tions, IET, vol. 8, no. 8, pp. 1274–1284, May 2014.
[18] L. Lai, Y. Liang, and W. Du, “Cooperative key generation in wireless networks,”
Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 30, no. 8, pp. 1578–
1588, September 2012.
[19] Y.-S. Shiu, S.-Y. Chang, H.-C. Wu, S.-H. Huang, and H.-H. Chen, “Physical
layer security in wireless networks: a tutorial,” Wireless Communications, IEEE,
vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 66–74, April 2011.
[20] Q. Wang, H. Su, K. Ren, and K. Kim, “Fast and scalable secret key generation
exploiting channel phase randomness in wireless networks,” in INFOCOM, 2011
Proceedings IEEE, April 2011, pp. 1422–1430.
[21] A. Sayeed and A. Perrig, “Secure wireless communications: Secret keys through
multipath,” in Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, 2008. ICASSP 2008.
IEEE International Conference on, March 2008, pp. 3013–3016.
[22] D. Stinson, Cryptography: Theory and Practice,Second Edition, 2nd ed.
CRC/C&H, 2002.
[23] C.-X. Wang, X. Hong, X. Ge, X. Cheng, G. Zhang, and J. Thompson, “Coopera-
tive mimo channel models: A survey,” Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 48,
no. 2, pp. 80–87, February 2010.
[24] M. Di Renzo and M. Debbah, “Wireless physical-layer security: The challenges
ahead,” in Advanced Technologies for Communications, 2009. ATC ’09. Interna-
tional Conference on, Oct 2009, pp. 313–316.
[25] K. Ren, H. Su, and Q. Wang, “Secret key generation exploiting channel charac-
teristics in wireless communications,” Wireless Communications, IEEE, vol. 18,
no. 4, pp. 6–12, August 2011.
115
[26] H. Liu, Y. Wang, J. Yang, and Y. Chen, “Fast and practical secret key extraction
by exploiting channel response,” in INFOCOM, 2013 Proceedings IEEE, April
2013, pp. 3048–3056.
[27] J. Wallace and R. Sharma, “Automatic secret keys from reciprocal mimo wireless
channels: Measurement and analysis,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 381–392, Sept 2010.
[28] C.-X. Wang, X. Hong, X. Ge, X. Cheng, G. Zhang, and J. Thompson, “Coopera-
tive mimo channel models: A survey,” Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 48,
no. 2, pp. 80–87, February 2010.
[29] H. Zhou, L. Huie, and L. Lai, “Secret key generation in the two-way relay channel
with active attackers,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 476–488, March 2014.
[30] C.-X. Wang, X. Hong, X. Ge, X. Cheng, G. Zhang, and J. Thompson, “Coopera-
tive mimo channel models: A survey,” Communications Magazine, IEEE, vol. 48,
no. 2, pp. 80–87, February 2010.
[31] B. Wang, J. Zhang, and A. Host-Madsen, “On the capacity of mimo relay chan-
nels,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 51, no. 1, pp. 29–43, Jan
2005.
[32] Y. Fan and J. Thompson, “Mimo configurations for relay channels: Theory and
practice,” Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 6, no. 5, pp.
1774–1786, May 2007.
[33] S. Pan, B. Ji, and Y. Luan, “Reliability research of wireless sensor network node,”
in Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design (CSCWD), 2010 14th Inter-
national Conference on, April 2010, pp. 444–447.
[34] M. Kubo, M. Sun, K. Yanagihara, and S. Hara, “A multiple cooperative nodes
selection method for reliable wireless multi-hop data transmission,” in Wireless
116
Communication Systems (ISWCS), 2012 International Symposium on, Aug 2012,
pp. 486–490.
[35] M. Kubo, D. Anzai, and S. Hara, “Selection criteria of cooperative nodes for reli-
able wireless multi-hop data transmission,” in Wireless Communication Systems
(ISWCS), 2010 7th International Symposium on, Sept 2010, pp. 345–349.
[36] B. Mainaud, V. Gauthier, and H. Afifi, “Cooperative communication for wireless
sensors network : A mac protocol solution,” in Wireless Days, 2008. WD ’08. 1st
IFIP, Nov 2008, pp. 1–5.
[37] K. El-Darymli, “Amplify-and-forward cooperative relaying for a linear wireless
sensor network,” in Systems Man and Cybernetics (SMC), 2010 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on, Oct 2010, pp. 106–112.
[38] H.-S. Yang and S.-J. Yoo, “Authentication techniques for improving the reliability
of the nodes in the manet,” in IT Convergence and Security (ICITCS), 2014
International Conference on, Oct 2014, pp. 1–3.
[39] X. Lin and X. Li, “Achieving efficient cooperative message authentication in ve-
hicular ad hoc networks,” Vehicular Technology, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 62,
no. 7, pp. 3339–3348, Sept 2013.
[40] K. Chen and B. Natarajan, “Evaluating node reliability in cooperative mimo net-
works (under review),” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions
on, 2015.
[41] K. Chen, B. Natarajan, and S. Shatti, “Relay-based secret key generation in LTE-
A,” in Communications and Network Security: Physical Layer security workshop.
IEEE Conference on, Oct 2014.
[42] K. Chen and B. Natarajan, “Mimo-based secret key generation strategies: Rate
analysis,” International Journal of Mobile Computing and Multimedia Commu-
nications (IJMCMC), vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 22–55, Jan 2015.
117
[43] K. Chen, B. Natarajan, and S. Shattil, “Secret key generation rate with power
allocation in relay-based lte-a networks,” Information Forensics and Security,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 10, no. 11, pp. 2424–2434, Nov 2015.
[44] K. Chen and B. Natarajan, “Network tomography based node reliability evalu-
ation in cooperative mimo networks (under review),” Special Issue on Physical
Layer Security for Emerging Wireless Networks: From Theory to Practice, 2015.
[45] R. Ahlswede and I. Csiszar, “The role of common randomness in information the-
ory and cryptography, part 1: Secrecy constraints,” in Information Theory, 1991
(papers in summary form only received), Proceedings. 1991 IEEE International
Symposium on (Cat. No.91CH3003-1), Jun 1991, pp. 265–265.
[46] G. Brassard and L. Salvail, “Secret-key reconciliation by public discussion.”
Springer-Verlag, 1994, pp. 410–423.
[47] S. Mathur, W. Trappe, N. Mandayam, C. Ye, and A. Reznik, “Radio-telepathy:
Extracting a secret key from an unauthenticated wireless channel,” in Proceedings
of the 14th ACM International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking,
ser. MobiCom ’08. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2008, pp. 128–139. [Online].
Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1409944.1409960
[48] Y.-S. Shiu, S. Y. Chang, H.-C. Wu, S.-H. Huang, and H.-H. Chen, “Physical
layer security in wireless networks: a tutorial,” Wireless Communications, IEEE,
vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 66–74, April 2011.
[49] R. Wilson, D. Tse, and R. Scholtz, “Channel identification: Secret sharing using
reciprocity in ultrawideband channels,” in Ultra-Wideband, 2007. ICUWB 2007.
IEEE International Conference on, Sept 2007, pp. 270–275.
[50] L. Lai, Y. Liang, and W. Du, “Phy-based cooperative key generation in wireless
networks,” in Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), 2011 49th
Annual Allerton Conference on, Sept 2011, pp. 662–669.
118
[51] J. B. Matthieu Bloch, Physical-Layer Security: From Information Theory to Se-
curity Engineering. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[52] S. N. Premnath, S. Jana, J. Croft, P. L. Gowda, M. Clark, S. K. Kasera,
N. Patwari, and S. V. Krishnamurthy, “Secret key extraction from wireless sig-
nal strength in real environments,” Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 917–930, May 2013.
[53] B. Azimi-sadjadi, A. Mercado, B. Yener, and et al., “Robust key generation from
signal envelopes in wireless networks,” 2007.
[54] A. Ghosh and R. Ratasuk, “Multi-antenna systems for lte enodeb,” in Vehicular
Technology Conference Fall (VTC 2009-Fall), 2009 IEEE 70th, Sept 2009, pp.
1–4.
[55] D. Gesbert, M. Shafi, D. shan Shiu, P. Smith, and A. Naguib, “From theory to
practice: an overview of mimo space-time coded wireless systems,” Selected Areas
in Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 281–302, Apr 2003.
[56] A. Paulraj, D. GORE, R. Nabar, and H. Bolcskei, “An overview of mimo com-
munications - a key to gigabit wireless,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 92, no. 2,
pp. 198–218, Feb 2004.
[57] A. Goldsmith, S. Jafar, N. Jindal, and S. Vishwanath, “Capacity limits of mimo
channels,” Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on, vol. 21, no. 5,
pp. 684–702, June 2003.
[58] Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy system,” Bell Systems Technical
Journal, vol. 28, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[59] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory. New York,
NY, USA: Wiley-Interscience, 1991.
119
[60] A. Pierrot and M. Bloch, “Strongly secure communications over the two-way
wiretap channel,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 595–605, Sept 2011.
[61] J. Wallace and R. Sharma, “Automatic secret keys from reciprocal mimo wireless
channels: Measurement and analysis,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 381–392, Sept 2010.
[62] N. Patwari, J. Croft, S. Jana, and S. Kasera, “High-rate uncorrelated bit ex-
traction for shared secret key generation from channel measurements,” Mobile
Computing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 17–30, Jan 2010.
[63] C. Chen and M. Jensen, “Secret key establishment using temporally and spatially
correlated wireless channel coefficients,” Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 205–215, Feb 2011.
[64] K. Chen and B. Natarajan, “Mimo-based secret key generation strategies: Rate
analysis,” in Innovative Algorithms and Techniques for Securing Wireless Net-
works, ser. Advances in Information Security, Privacy, and Ethics (AISPE) Book
Series. Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2015.
[65] I. Hammerstrom and A. Wittneben, “Power allocation schemes for amplify-and-
forward mimo-ofdm relay links,” Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 6, no. 8, pp. 2798–2802, August 2007.
[66] Z. Fang, Y. Hua, and J. Koshy, “Joint source and relay optimization for a non-
regenerative mimo relay,” in Sensor Array and Multichannel Processing, 2006.
Fourth IEEE Workshop on, July 2006, pp. 239–243.
[67] Y. Rong and Y. Hua, “Optimality of diagonalization of multi-hop mimo relays,”
Wireless Communications, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 12, pp. 6068–6077,
December 2009.
120
[68] S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe, Convex Optimization. Cambridge, U.K: Cam-
bridge Univ. Press, 2004.
[69] D. Palomar, J. Cioffi, and M.-A. Lagunas, “Uniform power allocation in mimo
channels: a game-theoretic approach,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions
on, vol. 49, no. 7, pp. 1707–1727, July 2003.
[70] K. Chen, B. Natarajan, and S. Shattil, “Relay-based secret key generation in
lte-a,” in Communications and Network Security (CNS), 2014 IEEE Conference
on, Oct 2014, pp. 139–144.
[71] ——, “Secret key generation rate with power allocation in relay-based lte-a net-
works,” Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on, vol. PP,
no. 99, pp. 1–1, 2015.
[72] T. Yucek and H. Arslan, “A survey of spectrum sensing algorithms for cognitive
radio applications,” Communications Surveys Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 11, no. 1, pp.
116–130, First 2009.
[73] M. Sankaran, “Approximations to the non-central chi-square distribution,”
Biometrika, vol. 50, no. 1/2, pp. pp. 199–204, 1963. [Online]. Available:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2333761
[74] ——, “On the non-central chi-square distribution,” Biometrika, vol. 46, no. 1/2,
pp. pp. 235–237, 1959. [Online]. Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2332828
[75] I. Hoballah and P. Varshney, “Distributed bayesian signal detection,” Information
Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 995–1000, Sep 1989.
[76] H. V. Poor, An Introduction to Signal Detection and Estimation (2Nd Ed.). New
York, NY, USA: Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 1994.
[77] N. Gnanapandithan, “Data detection and fusion in decentralized sensor net-
works,” Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State University, 2005.
121
[78] H. ElSawy, E. Hossain, and M. Haenggi, “Stochastic geometry for modeling,
analysis, and design of multi-tier and cognitive cellular wireless networks: A
survey,” Communications Surveys Tutorials, IEEE, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 996–1019,
Third 2013.
[79] R. Castro, M. Coates, G. Liang, R. Nowak, and B. Yu, “Network tomography:
recent developments,” Statistical Science, vol. 19, pp. 499–517, 2004.
[80] M. Coates and R. Nowak, “Network tomography for internal delay estimation,”
in Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2001. Proceedings. (ICASSP ’01).
2001 IEEE International Conference on, vol. 6, 2001, pp. 3409–3412 vol.6.
[81] A. Tsang, M. Coates, and R. D. Nowak, “Network delay tomography,” IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 51, pp. 2125–2136, 2003.
[82] Y. Vardi, “Network tomography: Estimating source-destination traffic intensities
from link data,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 91, no. 433,
pp. pp. 365–377, 1996. [Online]. Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2291416
[83] Y. Tsang, M. Coates, and R. Nowak, “Passive network tomography using em algo-
rithms,” in Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, 2001. Proceedings. (ICASSP
’01). 2001 IEEE International Conference on, vol. 3, 2001, pp. 1469–1472 vol.3.
[84] V. N. Padmanabhan, L. Qiu, and H. J. Wang, “Passive network tomography
using bayesian inference,” in Proceedings of the 2Nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop
on Internet Measurment, ser. IMW ’02. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2002, pp.
93–94. [Online]. Available: http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/637201.637214
[85] G. Sharma, S. Jaggi, and B. Dey, “Network tomography via network coding,” in
Information Theory and Applications Workshop, 2008, Jan 2008, pp. 151–157.
[86] G. Liang and B. Yu, “Maximum pseudo likelihood estimation in network tomog-
raphy,” Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 51, no. 8, pp. 2043–2053,
Aug 2003.
122
[87] A. Chen, J. Cao, and T. Bu, “Network tomography: Identifiability and fourier
domain estimation,” Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 58, no. 12,
pp. 6029–6039, Dec 2010.
[88] A. Chen and J. Cao, “Network tomography based on 1-d projections,” pp. 45–61.
[89] D. W. Scott, Multivariate Density Estimation: Theory, Practice, and Visualiza-
tion. New York, NY, USA: Wiley-Interscience, 1992.
[90] J. P. Keener, Principles of Applied Mathematics: Transformation and Approx-
imation. Boston, MA, USA: Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc.,
1988.
123
Appendix A
Proof of the non-concavity of Eq.
4.6
For simplicity in developing the argument, we assume only one antenna and one relay
node is involved in the proposed SKGR scheme (it is straightforward but notation-
ally tedious to expand the arguments to multiple antenna and multiple relay nodes
case). Since all the other parameters are known (except P and Q), we can rewrite the
objective function (Eq. 4.6) as follows.
f(x, y) = − log(1− axcy
(ax+ b)(cy + d)
) (A.1)
In order to proof the concavity of Eq. A.1, we need to examine its Hessian [90], which
is defined as:
H =
( fxx fxy
fyx fyy
)
, (A.2)
where
fxx =
∂2f
∂x2
= − a
2bcy(2adx+ bcy + 2bd)
(ax+ b)2(adx+ bcy + bd)2
(A.3)
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fxy =
∂2f
∂x∂y
= − abcd
(adx+ b(cy + d))2
(A.4)
fyx =
∂2f
∂y∂x
= − abcd
(adx+ b(cy + d))2
(A.5)
fyy =
∂2f
∂y2
= − ac
2dx(adx+ 2bcy + 2bd)
(cy + d)2(adx+ bcy + bd)2
(A.6)
According to [90], Eq. A.1 is concave if and only if H is negative semi-definite. The
sub-determinates of matrix H correspond to,
det(H1) = fxx < 0, (A.7)
det(H2) = fxxfyy − fxyfyx. (A.8)
It is easy to observe that Eq. A.7 is less than zero. However, for Eq. A.8, the sign
depends on the term
(a3bc3dxy(adx+ 2b(cy + d))(2adx+ b(cy + 2d)))
− (ax+ b)2(cy + d)2(a2b2c2d2),
(A.9)
which can be negative for some admissible values of x and y. Therefore, Eq. A.1 is
not a concave function of x and y.
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Appendix B
Proof of the Lemma 4
Since y is fixed and other parameters are known, the objective function can be written
as:
RSMIMO = −
1
2
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
log(1− ai,jx
ai,jx+ bi
∗ Cj) (B.1)
In order to maximize equation (9), we must maximize all the log terms in the sum-
mation. Therefore, It is important to check the concavity of the following expression.
f(x) = − log(1− ai,jx
ai,jx+ bi
∗ Cj) (B.2)
where, ai,j, bi, and Cj are known positive numbers. The first derivative of f(x) is:
f
′
(x) =
ai,jbiCj
(ai,jx+ bi)(bi − ai,j(Cj − 1)x) (B.3)
It is easy to observe that equation (54) is differentiable. Therefore, the second deriva-
tive of equation (53) can be calculated as:
f
′′
(x) =
a2i,jbiCj2a
2
i,j(Cj − 1)x+ bi(Cj − 2)
(ai,jx+ bi)2(bi − a2i,jx)2
(B.4)
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where, Cj =
a
′
i,jy
a
′
i,jy+b
′
j
. Since a
′
i,j, y, and b
′
j are known positive numbers, Cj should be
less than 1. Therefore, Cj − 1 < 0, Cj − 2 < 0, and f ′′(x) < 0.
Therefore, equation (10) is a concave function of x. Using a similar approach, we can
demonstrate that equation (10) is also a concave function of y.
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